On Thu, Jul 10, 2008 at 12:08 PM, Robert Elz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> This is the kind of thing we might have expected to see in a security > considerations section 15-20 years ago, when the network was a nice kind > friendly environment, where all the players would take great care not > to do anything that might cause a problem. Those days are long gone. Unfortunately were stuck with that infrastructure. Its good infrastructure - but not well policed - and insecure as hell because too many people built a system that assumed trust was the default value. > These days, if "the use of unsupported experimental code points" has the > "potential to disrupt the stable operation of the network" then that would > be something worthy of a CERT advisory and hasty code fixes by whatever > vendors are supplying the systems that would be disrupted. Ya - I hear you - but this way its a good way to sell DNSSEC and put Verisign in charge of the DNS keys. No thank you. But its worth watching what happens. (but of course, there's a "rule" > that says it must always be present, even when it is stupid, and obeying > the > rules is, of course, far more important than producing quality > documents...) Yes - we are only human. Rules are good. That does not mean rules can not be questioned. And changes made by consensus. cheers joe baptista -- Joe Baptista www.publicroot.org PublicRoot Consortium ---------------------------------------------------------------- The future of the Internet is Open, Transparent, Inclusive, Representative & Accountable to the Internet community @large. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Office: +1 (360) 526-6077 (extension 052) Fax: +1 (509) 479-0084
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