Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> There is a big difference in real engineering (i.e. outside a
> university) between a solution that only addresses part of a problem
> and one that is 'useless'.
> In observed attacks and in simulations, the IP-AS number attack is
> much more significant than the routing layer attack in most
> circumstances.
I'm not sure what are the IP-AS attack and the routing layer attack
and whether you are worrying about attacks today or year 3010.
So, before continuing discussion, I think you should write a draft
precisely defining problems including the attacks. The draft may
be more than 100 pages long.
It should be noted, however, that, it is likely that I point out the
attacks are identical, if I have enough time to read everal lines of
the draft.
> There are many security concerns that BGP security could address. The
> only concerns for which a BGP security solution is essential is to
> prevent Denial of Service attacks and to prevent hijacking of IPv4
> space
The point of previous discussion was that RPKI is useless for such
prevention. Read the ML log.
> after exhaustion is reached.
With A+P, it will be reached in year 3010 or later.
Masataka Ohta
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