On Dec 20, 2011, at 6:00 PM, Danny McPherson wrote:
>
> I'm kinda surprised the security ADs are OK with this in a brand new
> connection-oriented protocol meant to increase security of the network:
>
> S.7:
>
> "Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport
> over TCP using a port, rpki-rtr, to be assigned, see Section 12.
> Operators SHOULD use procedural means, ACLs, ... to reduce
> the exposure to authentication issues."
Yup.
Just below the text that you included there is: "If available to the operator,
caches and routers SHOULD use one of the following more protected protocols."
and a list of things including AO, SSH, TCP MD5, IPSEC, TLS.
Sections 7.1. (SSH Transport), 7.2. (TLS Transport), 7.3. (TCP MD5 Transport)
and 7.4. (TCP-AO Transport) provide more information on using these.
The Security Considerations section also say:
...
So the strength of the trust relationship and the transport
between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're
betting your routing on this.
…
Transports which can not provide the necessary authentication and
integrity (see Section 7) must rely on network design and
operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/
corruption attacks.
I'm sure that the authors would have preferred to simply say "Use TCP-AO", and
saved themselves a bunch of typing (and Security warnings, etc) -- it is
obvious that they are not tying to gloss over the concerns.
Unfortunately not all OSs support TCP-AO…. Well then, it seems that, as routers
already support SSH it should be simple to wrap a TCP stream, yes?
Unfortunately no -- not all implementations have a simple library type model.
Same things for IPSec / TLS, etc.
In an ideal world there would be ubiquitous, secure, fast, cheap, reliable,
unencumbered transport security -- unfortunately we are not there (yet). Folk
who have support for secure transports available should use them, but if I
don't, I'd still like to have the option to deploy this.
The perfect is the enemy of the good.
> -danny
Warren.
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