On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Tony Hain <[email protected]> wrote: > > Ted Hardie wrote: > > On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 4:59 PM, Tony Hain <[email protected]> wrote: > > Like it or not, governments are fundamentally opposed to the open nature > of > > 'the Internet', and they always will be (even the 'reasonable' ones). > > Managing information flow is how they derive and exercise power > > > > Aside from the whole "consent of the governed" issue, this perspective > seems > > historically fairly short-sighted. > > And that consent is based on information availability. Manage the > information, and you manage the consent. > > Possibly; the extent to which that management is obvious may, of course, drive other behavior (cf. самизда́т [Samizdat] and similar efforts).
> > ... > > Yes, there were treaty-based efforts to set some common > > understandings. Some of those were quite useful, but whenever they > actually > > impinged on workings of the real network you got smuggling. In some > cases, lots > > and lots of it, with encouragement from some of the participating > nations. > In > > other words, some countries tried to control their participants in these > > international networks very tightly. Some were content to let their > merchants > > get fat off it instead. There was no universal response. > > Shipping Merchant / Harbor Master == ISP : As you see with the > resolution > signatories, there is still no universal response. > > Given this, I am somewhat confused why you said "Governments are fundamentally opposed to the open nature of 'the Internet', and they always will be (even the 'reasonable' ones)." If some governments approve open harbors for shipping and (and its Internet parallel), how are those governments opposed to the open nature of the Internet? Did you mean "Some governments"? > ... > > In this new effort at a multilateral framework, we are seeing a clash > between a > > desire for sovereign control of the Internet and a desire to reap the > benefits of > > open participation. I think our role in that is to make sure all > involved > > understand: the benefits of the Internet's network effect; the risks in > allowing > > nations through which traffic passes to assert sovereignty over the > flows, > > As if professional information control practitioners do not understand the > risks of information control at a much deeper level than anyone in the IETF > could ever hope to ... > > The pace and chance of topological change are pieces that are commonly misunderstood outside the world of Internet engineering. The amount of surprise you get when you explain to someone why a routing announcement can pull all the traffic for your company through $RANDOM_COUNTRY seems perennial. > > especially given both the pace and chance of topological change; and the > reality > > that entities outside of governments control the paths that packets > actual > > traverse. > > The entities that operate and control the paths do so at the pleasure of > the > governments, just as the merchants and harbor masters did in your example > above. This is not the point I was making. The operator of an infrastructure may do so at the pleasure of the sovereign power in whose borders that infrastructure sits, but that does not guarantee that packets will flow over that infrastructure at the pleasure of that sovereign power. If I do not wish my packets from Den Haag to Paris to flow through the LINX, for example, I can ensure that they do not. That works because there are multiple paths over which I might send the flow. Internet routing is not as open as sea-born trade; there are paths that provide choke points. But single points of failure are not an advantage to Internet engineering, and providing them to engage well with specific governments both harms the Internet and, at least in some lights, harms the governments' interests as well. We can make sure that's understood and build out the infrastructure to minimize the choke points as best as we can. > As long as governments are pleased, the operators can live in a > fantasy land where they are outside government control. I don't think that this is a realistic characterization of operators' attitudes. > The Dubai > discussions show what happens when a collection of governments are no > longer > pleased ... If that noise level gets high enough the non-signers will have > to respond just to maintain some degree of cooperation on other matters > they > care about. > > Our role is to recognize that there are much bigger issues than the simple > process of bit delivery. Yes bit delivery is important, and dynamic, but it > is equivalent to laying the tracks. Standards must be maintained for > consistent interworking, but it is not the path that matters; just as with > rail cars, it is the content that provides the value. I certainly believe that the value is in the content; packets with no payload aren't terribly interesting, but I don't see how your conclusion changes the aims of the IETF in this regard. > Being highly dynamic > makes things harder to control, but not impossible. Even in the 'open' > countries, a few changes in something as apparently disconnected as tax > laws > would dramatically change the decisions and behaviors of the operators that > are 'outside of government control'. > > ... > > > > Patrik Fältström wrote: > > On 4 jan 2013, at 01:59, Tony Hain <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > Like it or not, governments are fundamentally opposed to the open > > > nature of 'the Internet', and they always will be (even the > 'reasonable' > ones). > > > > Because I do not think generalization is really a reasonable thing to do, > and even > > dangerous when discussing governance issues, I disagree with this > statement. > > I agree there is danger here, but I believe the greater danger is embodied > in this thread due to the lack of acknowledgement that governments always > have control, even if the control points are not obvious. > > You've returned, though, to doing what Patrik noted was a problem: treating all governments as if they were a homogeneous mass. A government controls a territory and has a set of interests. They are not an homogeneous mass. > > > > Governments want just like businesses success in whatever they do. That > can in > > general be divided in two wishes. Short term, in the form of being > re-elected (or > > not thrown out of their office) and long term, as in growth of the > revenue > of the > > country they govern. > > The second point (restated as 'prosperity for their constituency') is > really > just a continuation of the first point. > > > > > They of course have pieces of their operation that belong to law > enforcement > > agencies, but they also have those that are responsible of finding rules > so that > > non-public sector can grow (to later increase for example tax revenue). > > > > Because of this, I encourage people to not generalize per stakeholder > group, but > > instead acknowledge that there are different *forces* that are orthogonal > to > > each other, and calculating "the correct" balance between them is hard. > Or > > rather, different people do for different reasons get different results > when > > calculating what the for them proper balance is. > > > > That is why I personally am against generalization that a stakeholder > group have > > one specific view. > > I would agree that they all demonstrate a different calculation for the > importance of various aspects of controlling information flow. My primary > point here is that the IETF has to accept this as a reality. So far the > position has been 'this is the technology, & governments need to adapt'. At > the end of the day though, it is the governments that are really in > control, > and if the IETF does not want a 'forced adaptation', it need to evolve and > listen to the needs of a stakeholder group they have tried hard to ignore. > > If I can re-state that as "engage with", I would agree; the IETF needs to work with the Internet Society and others to engage in this process, or we are pretty much guaranteed not to like the outcomes. But this is not a case where we need to lie back and think of England; we need to be active parts of this process, rather than passively accepting what governments want. First and foremost because of the potential damage to the network and its users, but also to avoid induced multiple personality disorder from different governments saying different things. Sweden is not Syria and Chile is not China. > > > > Specifically governments. > > > > If when pushed to be forced to choose between two choices *all* > governments > > wanted to have control, we would have had many more governments signing > the > > proposed treaty that was on the table in Dubai. > > > > Instead, when being forced to choose, they picked openness and multi > > stakeholder bottom up processes. > > As noted above, this is due to relative happiness, and limited noise. If > the > noise level grows or they become unhappy, the independence of the standards > process is a minor pawn in the game, and will be sacrificed to protect > something more important. > > I believe we can maintain the IETF as independent. Under some dire outcomes, its output might cease to be called "standards" by the lights of certain countries or treaty organizations, and there are certainly risks there. But good specs are good specs, and government mandates have changed in favor of network effects before. In the mean time, though, far better to thank those who are engaging in this process, help them where we can, and keep our eyes on the real end goal: making the Internet work for everyone. regards, Ted > > ... > > Tony > > >
