Dan Kegel wrote:
> Have the security issues identified in
> http://www.mail-archive.com/bug-cvs%40gnu.org/msg00384.html
> been resolved yet?
>
> They were: "CVS/Checkin.prog and CVS/Update.prog can be
> replaced with an arbitrary binary, which will be blindly
> executed on the server"
> and "the client trusts paths sent from the server too much,
> so a malicious server can overwrite arbitrary files on client".
>
> I just checked the latest dev sources via anonymous CVS,
> and the quick and dirty fix suggested by that post for the first issue
> hasn't been applied. Has a more subtle fix been applied, or
> is this still outstanding?
I can't find anything in the ChangeLog, but following the thread, it
seems that the people who might have worked on a fix decided that the
urgency was low as it didn't affect users with read-only access but was
only possible if the attacker already had write access to the repository.
Derek
--
Derek Price CVS Solutions Architect (
http://CVSHome.org )
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] OpenAvenue ( http://OpenAvenue.com )
--
"I wish you and yours every joy in life, old chap, and tons of money, and
may you never die till I shoot you."
-James Joyce, "Dubliners"
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