That's why you would tunnel it over ssh or something like that, with limited key access. People you trust get the key, and their key gets kept on the server. Definitely, a wide-open pserver connection is just an invitation to get cracked.
Jan > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Monday, December 16, 2002 5:13 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Security, audits and pserver > > > Walter, Jan writes: > > > > Personally I tend to believe that giving people any sort of local > > access (even in a chrooted environment for the user for > instance) is > > more of a security risk than allowing pserver access over ssl/ssh, > > with the limited number of users having the key needed to connect > > (i.e. Auto-key negotiation disabled and so on). This limits the > > exposure of pserver to people already having the public key of the > > server (and their public key registered there). > > Note that giving anyone pserver access to a machine is > equivalent to giving them local shell access -- there are > fairly simple tricks that can be used to execute arbitrary > code on the server. CVS was not designed as a security > application, it was designed as a collaboration application > for cooperative users. > > -Larry Jones > > Let's just sit here a moment... and savor the impending > terror. -- Calvin > _______________________________________________ Info-cvs mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://mail.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/info-cvs
