http://www.nipc.gov/publications/highlights/2002/highlight02-02.htm

NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CENTER HIGHLIGHTS

A publication providing information on infrastructure protection
issues, with emphasis on computer and network security matters.


Issue 2-02
May 15, 2002


Editors: Linda Garrison
Martin Grand

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Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center
Buffer Overflows: Well-known Problems Persists in the Face of Increased
Awareness
Security Implications of Software Quality: Software Patch Management
Workloads are a Part of Larger Problems
Advance Fee Fraud: Infrastructure Providers Should Not Be Deceived


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Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center

This article continues our series of overviews of critical infrastructure
industry initiatives established in response to Presidential Decisions
Directive 63 (PDD-63).

The Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC)
is a forum for sharing information about network vulnerabilities and related
threat and countermeasure information. The IT-ISAC is a non-profit
corporation with approximately twenty member corporations that:

Report and exchange information among industry members regarding electronic
incidents
Collaborate on newly-discovered software vulnerabilities and countermeasure
development
Promote strategies to protect against hostile action
Assist in maintaining continuity of operations and rapid recovery
In the twelve months following its inception, the IT-ISAC has made available
to the public a number of analyses on software vulnerabilities and
recommendations to improve the overall network security environments.

The IT-ISAC provides a means for critical infrastructure sector members
whose business emphasis is, or depends on, Information Technology to freely
exchange information regarding security incidents without revealing
information that may otherwise be subject to Freedom of Information act and
Open Record laws. The ability to maintain this privacy is important to any
corporation looking to guard its proprietary information while collaborating
with like entities in defending against an attack.

In January 2002, the IT-ISAC and the NIPC signed an information exchange
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU specifies, among other things,
that:

"The IT-ISAC will report on a voluntary basis to provide the NIPC with …
information on unscheduled service outages, degraded operations and serious
threats to information systems and networks, provided they meet mutually
established reporting criteria and thresholds … Likewise, the NIPC will
provide the IT-ISAC with the following types of information, at its
discretion, concerning the IT-infrastructure: unscheduled service outages,
degraded operations, Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, virus alerts,
network scanning, or spoofing of networks."

For more information on the IT-ISAC, please visit their web site at
https://www.it-isac.org, send an email to [EMAIL PROTECTED], or phone
(404) 236-2880.


Buffer Overflows: Well-known Problem Persists in the Face of Increased
Awareness

Despite being one of the oldest known computer security problems, buffer
overflows continue to be the most prevalent type of attack on the Internet.
In 2001, 19 CERT advisories, out of a total of 37, warned of vulnerabilities
resulting from overflows. Most recently, warnings concerning the serious
defects in SNMP included inherent vulnerabilities to buffer overflow
attacks. This flaw is frequently targeted because of the opportunity it
offers for remote attackers to gain root access of a victim's computer.

Buffer Overflows
A buffer overflow results when an attempt is made to place more data in a
temporary storage area, known as a buffer, than it was designed to hold. A
basic example consists of a program requiring some type of input, such as a
username. A programmer must reserve a spot in memory to hold this data,
entering more data into the buffer than a programmer has allotted can cause
it to overflow. When the data exceeds the bounds of the buffer, it can
overflow into other areas of memory, which may allow an attacker to inject
and run malicious code.

While this type of attack has been around for quite some time, the frequency
increased greatly in the 1990's, due largely to several infamous papers
published on the Internet detailing the ABC's of exploiting this
vulnerability. In addition to online tutorials, the availability of
automated tools designed to exploit buffer overflows caused a significant
escalation of this type of attack. This had the effect of enabling novices,
who previously may have lacked the required skills to write their own
exploits.

Prevention
Buffer overflows are the result of poor programming practices, primarily in
the C and C++ programming languages. Taking steps to ensure size limits are
not exceeded, known as bounds checking, and avoiding unsafe string
operations can mitigate this issue.

There are, however, many programs containing legacy code/libraries, which
are still in use. Reviewing these programs can be daunting, as some programs
are based on many hundreds of thousands of lines of code. Even after
extensive review, problems can still surface. Steps to alleviate problems
with buffer overflows include the following:

When possible, avoid running services with root or administrative
privileges. In that when when an attacker runs exploit code, they inherit
the privileges that the service is running under. Running at a lower
privilege level can limit the attack.
Coding in safer languages, when appropriate, can reduce overflows.
It is critical that system administrators keep track of newly discovered
vulnerabilities and patch systems immediately (the NIPC's CyberNotes can
help when planning priorities).
The bottom line - Emphasize avoiding buffer overflows during the software
design and testing phases as a software quality objective to reduce the
prevalence of buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
Security Implications of Software Quality:
Software Patch Management Workloads Are A Part of Larger Problems

Protecting against Known Software Vulnerabilities Account for the Majority
of time Dedicated by System Administrators. Software patch deployments to
address security issues are widely regarded as a major component of system
administrators' workloads. In November 2001, Activis, a UK security company,
reported research illustrating the contribution of patch deployments to
system administrators' workloads. Activis found that a relatively small
network of mixed vendor products with only eight firewalls and nine servers
would have required 1,315 vendor software updates, or five per day, during a
nine-month period in 2001.

Software User and Computer Security Community Views on Quality and Security.
Many in both the software user community and computer security community
believe that constant releases of vendor software patches result from
vulnerabilities and problems that should have been detected and corrected
before vendor software packages are released. Additionally, it is viewed
that rushing software to market, results in quality and security not being
"designed in." Users see quality and security being addressed later, often
after the software packages have been widely deployed to customers.

Software Vendors' Views on Quality and Security.
Software vendors do not intentionally produce defective code. They are
concerned for both the reputation of their brand names as well as for
customer impacts that software quality problems cause. Vendors also note
that some problems experienced by users are not solely based with issues
that vendors can control. User demand has contributed to "feature creep"
resulting in software packages with many more lines of code and increasingly
complex security requirements. Customization of vendor software by user
organizations often introduces new problems. Additionally, some technical
professionals note that system administrator training problems, insufficient
management emphasis on security, and poor security practices and policies
contribute to security concerns of which software quality issues are only
one factor.

Critical Infrastructure and Enterprise Network Implications: Progress
improving software quality and security in networks and infrastructures can
only result if all parties address the issues contributing to the problems.
Vendors must continue initiatives to improve software quality, particularly
in areas with security implications. Software user organizations, including
government, must improve the management and practice of security. Key
references for user organizations include:

CERT® Security Improvement Modules provide an overview of managing the
functions of security at http://www.cert.org/security-improvement/#modules.
The SANS/FBI Twenty Most Critical Internet Security Vulnerabilities
(Updated), The Experts' Consensus, Version 2.501, November 15, 2001 provides
a prioritized approach to addressing the most dangerous security issues
involved in the majority of successful computer system attacks at
http://www.sans.org/top20.htm.
The National Infrastructure Protection Center's CyberNotes: 2001 Year End
Summary, Issue # 2001-26, December 31, 2001 provides a summary of security
problems by vendor at
http://www.nipc.gov/cybernotes/2001/cyberissue2001-26.pdf
Advance Fee Fraud: Infrastructure Providers Should Not Be Deceived

The spread of the Internet is removing barriers to communication of all
types, including those with criminal intent. Fraudulent solicitations
targeting individuals and companies are increasingly being disseminated via
e-mail.

Advance Fee Fraud. One well-known type of scheme generally known as advance
fee fraud involves an attempt to trick a victim into making up-front
payments with the promise that his investment will lead to a large payoff in
the future. These scams typically begin with a letter or fax-or, more
recently, an e-mail-ostensibly sent by a government official or
businessperson in a foreign country. The letter relates a cover story that
the writer is looking for a trustworthy person or company in the U.S. to
help recover funds related to "an over-invoiced government contract" or
"contract overpayments" or other questionable source. The victim is offered
a large commission in order to assist in an international bank transfer and
is requested to provide company letterhead and/or financial details such as
bank account information in order to facilitate the transaction. Victims may
also be asked to forward funds to cover various "bank fees" or "transfer
taxes" or other up-front expenditures.

There are many variations of this type of fraud. Some scams offer crude oil
allocations at below market rate, if the victim is only able to pre-pay
certain licensing fees or duties. Others solicitations relate a bogus story
of needing a front company to facilitate an oil or telecommunications
contract for a group of civil servants. The deception may be remarkably
elaborate, possibly including invitations abroad or the planting of bogus
articles in foreign media to provide a pretext for the deception. There are
estimates that damages caused by advance fee fraud amount to hundreds of
millions of dollars annually.

The Infrastructure Connection. Many advance fee solicitations ostensibly
originate from infrastructure-related entities: a bank; a national petroleum
corporation, electric power authority, or other entity in the energy
industry; a national telecommunications company; or a government financial
ministry or regulatory body responsible for overseeing mineral resources.
Some also purport to deal with the provision of infrastructure-related
services. There is, however, no legitimate infrastructure connection in
these solicitations; law enforcement data indicate that fraud artists
specializing in advance fee schemes utilize international business
directories, trade and business journals, media advertisements, and the
Internet to locate prospective victims.

Infrastructure providers should not confuse advance fee solicitations with
legitimate business offers from abroad. If they receive a letter or e-mail
of this type, infrastructure providers should not be deceived by any
ostensible industry links mentioned in the solicitation. The U.S. Department
of Commerce can assist U.S. businesses in establishing the legitimacy of
international business proposals. Fraudulent business solicitations should
be referred to the Financial Crimes Division of the U.S. Secret Service or
to the Internet Fraud Complaint Center run by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the National White Collar Crime Center on the Internet at
http://www.ifccfbi.gov.






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