I agree with him on this, and for the other comments in this post.  -- rick


U.S. is “Incapable of Keeping a Secret,” Rumsfeld Concluded in 2005
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/?p=5385

In one of his trademark “snowflake” memoranda from 2005 that was made public 
this week, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated flatly that the 
government secrecy system was a failure.

“The United States Government is incapable of keeping a secret,” he wrote (pdf) 
on November 2, 2005.  “If one accepts that, and I do, that means that the U.S. 
Government will have to craft policies that reflect that reality.”

Unfortunately, he did not elaborate on this terse statement.  The memorandum 
was not addressed to anyone in particular, and the profound questions it raises 
were left hanging.  There was no known written response to the memo and, 
needless to say, there is no evidence of any subsequent shift to a post-secrecy 
orientation in government policy.

“Not to sound too cynical,” said a former official who served in the Bush 
Administration, “but I would add to Rumsfeld’s observation that not only is the 
U.S. incapable of keeping a secret but it is also incapable of fundamentally 
reforming the way it keeps secrets.  I know from a practical point of view, 
even after that snowflake, I found DoD to be one of the most recalcitrant 
organizations with which to deal,” he added (on a not-for-attribution basis).

But a current official disputed the premise of the Rumsfeld memo.  “We are 
capable of keeping secrets– the issue is how many and how long,” he said.  “The 
more we seek to protect and the longer we seek to protect it the less likely we 
will meet with success.  The classification system can’t be effective if we 
over-burden the system.”

This official said that the new Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, could still 
transform the military secrecy system in a meaningful way if he were to treat 
it as a “mission critical” instrument to be used sparingly and with precision 
rather than as an inherited bureaucracy that does not have to meet any 
performance standards at all.

Another current official pondered “What would change if one presumed that the 
U.S. government cannot keep a secret?  I doubt that many USG officials would 
say that we should therefore stop trying.  The most likely and positive 
conclusion might be that we should severely limit the number and kinds of 
secrets we seek to protect.”

In fact, that seems to be the conclusion that was reached by Secretary Rumsfeld 
himself in another startling snowflake (pdf) dated August 9, 2005 and addressed 
to Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), Stephen Cambone:

“What do you think about initiating a program of finding ways to reduce the 
number of things that are classified, and to speed up the process of 
declassification?”, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote.

Again, this memorandum had no known practical consequences.  Dr. Cambone did 
not immediately reply to an email inquiry from Secrecy News concerning his 
response to the Rumsfeld memo.

But it so happens that a focused effort “to reduce the number of things that 
are classified” is (or is supposed to be) underway right now throughout the 
executive branch, in the form of a Fundamental Classification Guidance Review 
(FCGR) that was required by President Obama’s executive order 13526 (section 
1.9), which was issued in December 2009.

To date, there is little sign that the Review has made any progress at all in 
reducing the scope of the national security classification system.  But William 
A. Cira, the acting director of the Information Security Oversight Office, said 
that Pentagon classification officials were responding constructively to the 
Review requirement.

“We know they are moving forward on the FCGR process and they have already 
mapped out a plan for doing so.  In the near future we will be discussing the 
DoD FCGR plan in depth with the staff at USD(I), and it is our understanding 
that they will have much to tell us,” Mr. Cira said.  The FCGR process must be 
completed by all agencies that classify information no later than June 2012.

The two Rumsfeld snowflakes on classification policy were among more than 500 
previously undisclosed memos that were posted on Secretary Rumsfeld’s website 
on July 12.

It is not known exactly what might have prompted Rumsfeld to issue these 
statements.  Then as now, leaks were in the air.  “The issue of leaks has been 
front and center in the news, in case some of you hadn’t noticed,” House 
Intelligence Committee chairman Pete Hoekstra told the Heritage Foundation on 
July 25, 2005.

Aside from their specific content, the Rumsfeld snowflakes have a couple of 
other noteworthy features.  First, they were marked FOUO, or “for official use 
only.”  In other words, they were produced for internal consumption, not to 
inspire a public conversation on secrecy policy.

Second, each snowflake is stamped “certified as unclassified [in accordance 
with]” the executive order on classification.  But there is no requirement in 
the executive order to “certify” records as unclassified.  Whoever did so was 
wasting his time, while diverting scarce resources from declassification and 
other legitimate information security programs.
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