N.S.A. Gets More Latitude to Share Intercepted Communications

By CHARLIE SAVAGEJAN. 12, 2017

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/us/politics/nsa-gets-more-latitude-to-share-intercepted-communications.html

WASHINGTON — In its final days, the Obama administration has expanded the power 
of the National Security Agency to share globally intercepted personal 
communications with the government’s 16 other intelligence agencies before 
applying privacy protections.

The new rules significantly relax longstanding limits on what the N.S.A. may do 
with the information gathered by its most powerful surveillance operations, 
which are largely unregulated by American wiretapping laws. These include 
collecting satellite transmissions, phone calls and emails that cross network 
switches abroad, and messages between people abroad that cross domestic network 
switches.

The change means that far more officials will be searching through raw data. 
Essentially, the government is reducing the risk that the N.S.A. will fail to 
recognize that a piece of information would be valuable to another agency, but 
increasing the risk that officials will see private information about innocent 
people.

Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch signed the new rules, permitting the N.S.A. 
to disseminate “raw signals intelligence information,” on Jan. 3, after the 
director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., signed them on Dec. 
15, according to a 23-page, largely declassified copy of the procedures.

Previously, the N.S.A. filtered information before sharing intercepted 
communications with another agency, like the C.I.A. or the intelligence 
branches of the F.B.I. and the Drug Enforcement Administration. The N.S.A.’s 
analysts passed on only information they deemed pertinent, screening out the 
identities of innocent people and irrelevant personal information.

Now, other intelligence agencies will be able to search directly through raw 
repositories of communications intercepted by the N.S.A. and then apply such 
rules for “minimizing” privacy intrusions.

“This is not expanding the substantive ability of law enforcement to get access 
to signals intelligence,” said Robert S. Litt, the general counsel to Mr. 
Clapper. “It is simply widening the aperture for a larger number of analysts, 
who will be bound by the existing rules.”

But Patrick Toomey, a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union, called the 
move an erosion of rules intended to protect the privacy of Americans when 
their messages are caught by the N.S.A.’s powerful global collection methods. 
He noted that domestic internet data was often routed or stored abroad, where 
it may get vacuumed up without court oversight.

“Rather than dramatically expanding government access to so much personal data, 
we need much stronger rules to protect the privacy of Americans,” Mr. Toomey 
said. “Seventeen different government agencies shouldn’t be rooting through 
Americans’ emails with family members, friends and colleagues, all without ever 
obtaining a warrant.”

The N.S.A. has been required to apply similar privacy protections to 
foreigners’ information since early 2014, an unprecedented step that President 
Obama took after the disclosures of N.S.A. documents by the former intelligence 
contractor Edward J. Snowden. The other intelligence agencies will now have to 
follow those rules, too.

Under the new system, agencies will ask the N.S.A. for access to specific 
surveillance feeds, making the case that they contain information relevant and 
useful to their missions. The N.S.A. will grant requests it deems reasonable 
after considering factors like whether large amounts of Americans’ private 
information might be included and, if so, how damaging or embarrassing it would 
be if that information were “improperly used or disclosed.”

The move is part of a broader trend of tearing down bureaucratic barriers to 
sharing intelligence between agencies that dates back to the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. In 2002, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court secretly began permitting the N.S.A., the F.B.I. and the 
C.I.A. to share raw intercepts gathered domestically under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.

After Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Act — which legalized warrantless 
surveillance on domestic soil so long as the target is a foreigner abroad, even 
when the target is communicating with an American — the court permitted raw 
sharing of emails acquired under that program, too.

In July 2008, the same month Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act, President 
George W. Bush modified Executive Order 12333, which sets rules for 
surveillance that domestic wiretapping statutes do not address, including 
techniques that vacuum up vast amounts of content without targeting anybody.

After the revision, Executive Order 12333 said the N.S.A. could share the raw 
fruits of such surveillance after the director of national intelligence and the 
attorney general, coordinating with the defense secretary, agreed on 
procedures. It took another eight years to develop those rules.

The Times first reported the existence of those deliberations in 2014 and later 
filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit for documents about them. It ended 
that case last February, and Mr. Litt discussed the efforts in an interview at 
that time, but declined to divulge certain important details because the rules 
were not yet final or public.

Among the most important questions left unanswered in February was when 
analysts would be permitted to use Americans’ names, email addresses or other 
identifying information to search a 12333 database and pull up any messages to, 
from or about them that had been collected without a warrant.

There is a parallel debate about the FISA Amendments Act’s warrantless 
surveillance program. National security analysts sometimes search that act’s 
repository for Americans’ information, as do F.B.I. agents working on ordinary 
criminal cases. Critics call this the “backdoor search loophole,” and some 
lawmakers want to require a warrant for such searches.

By contrast, the 12333 sharing procedures allow analysts, including those at 
the F.B.I., to search the raw data using an American’s identifying information 
only for the purpose of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
investigations, not for ordinary criminal cases. And they may do so only if one 
of several other conditions are met, such as a finding that the American is an 
agent of a foreign power.

However, under the rules, if analysts stumble across evidence that an American 
has committed any crime, they will send it to the Justice Department.

The limits on using Americans’ information gathered under Order 12333 do not 
apply to metadata: logs showing who contacted whom, but not what they said. 
Analysts at the intelligence agencies may study social links between people, in 
search of hidden associates of known suspects, “without regard to the location 
or nationality of the communicants.”
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