> Begin forwarded message: > > From: Mark M > Subject: The Brain of the Pentagon > Date: May 13, 2019 at 07:06:20 EDT > > The Brain of the Pentagon > By Eliot A. Cohen > > May 12, 2019 > > https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/05/brain-pentagon/156843/ > > > When the memorial service for the former defense official Andrew W. Marshall, > who recently passed away at the age of 97, was held, an eclectic throng > attended. Former senior Cabinet officials, generals (the vice chairman of the > Joint Chiefs of Staff gave one of the eulogies), professors, think tankers, > and bureaucrats from several continents showed up. There were historians, > anthropologists, economists, journalists, and political scientists. But it > was not a gathering of the establishment, for these were the cranky insiders > rather than the complacent wielders of authority. And all of us thought of > ourselves as members of what is affectionately known as St. Andrew’s Prep. > > Andy came to Washington in 1969 from the Rand Corporation to work for Henry > Kissinger. His friend James Schlesinger recruited him from there to create > and run the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon in 1973, and he retired > out of that job an astounding 42 years later. In that time, he influenced not > only the senior civilian and military leadership of the Pentagon > (emphatically, some more than others), but generations of students of > national-security affairs. > > Put at its most simple, net assessment is about comparing opposing sides in > actual or potential conflict. That might sound straightforward, but it is > not. Intelligence agencies focus on the other—they are by culture and > sometimes by bureaucratic practice allergic to studying their own side. The > military engages in planning, of course, but that is not the same thing as > assessment, because action is very different from analysis. Think tanks > usually conduct their studies with an eye on clearly defined deliverables in > well-measured times for particular clients. Universities do all kinds of > analytic work, but very rarely with the kind of highly classified information > that is needed. > > Related: Is the Pentagon Truly Committed to the National Defense Strategy? > Related: The Pentagon’s First AI Strategy Will Focus on Near-Term Operations > — and Safety > Related: The National Defense Strategy Is No Strategy > What Andy Marshall invented (and it was his invention) was something else: a > sober, multifaceted, long-range scrutiny of military balances that probed for > hidden asymmetries of strategy or organizational behavior, and that took in > everything—from geography to technology, order of battle to styles of > command, and culture to bureaucratic routine. Many of the products were > highly classified. Some were well known (such as his iconic assessment of the > standoff in Central Europe during the Cold War) and some went to only one or > two consumers. They gave no clear guidelines for immediate action. Indeed, > the reason the Office of Net Assessment flourished was because, from a narrow > bureaucratic point of view, it threatened no one. Some secretaries of defense > neither understood its work nor cared about it; the clever ones, such as > Schlesinger and Harold Brown, treasured it. > > At any given time, fewer than a dozen bright young officers and civilians at > most were at the heart of the ONA, but its intellectual ripples extended far > away. Read Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision, and there in the credits you > will see Andy Marshall. Look at some of the finer literature on intelligence > and on military effectiveness in the interwar period and World War II, and > you will see that it was sponsored by Andy Marshall. Read about how the > United States sharply revised downward its estimate of the size of the Soviet > economy in the mid-1980s, and you will see that it rested on work by émigré > Soviet economists who had been disregarded by their more orthodox Western > counterparts. Andy had contracted for, and championed, their work. > > Andy was an intellectual magpie. He devoured books on early-19th-century > military history (“Read Dominic Lieven’s book on how the Russians beat > Napoleon; it will change your view of Russian military culture”), Chinese > philosophy, and biological anthropology. To be sure, privates often think of > their sergeants as apes; Andy wondered what it meant that the generals and > politicians had a good deal of the primate in them, too. He wrote very > little, in part because he was a perfectionist. As more than one subordinate > or contractor ruefully acknowledged, you would give him something you had > written, he would mumble at you and say “Do it again,” and after the third or > fourth go, it was the best thing you had ever written in your life. > > Andy’s was the life of the mind, devoted to the study of conflict and > informed by a deep and abiding—if often pessimistic—love of the United > States. He would listen to anyone who had something to say, be it a Harvard > professor or a graduate student masquerading as a reserve second lieutenant. > He liked the oddballs—those dissident Soviet economists, the crackbrained > technologists, the impossibly insubordinate armor officers, the eccentric > hedge-fund guy who was willing to help the country while trying to figure out > which way the financial winds were blowing. > > What those memorializing Andy remembered most, however, was his kindness. He > could be tough, and on rare occasions—when someone was appallingly stupid or > had behaved very badly—he could get angry, but that was rare. For the most > part, he gave. He gave opportunities for scholars whose work did not quite > fit within disciplinary boundaries. He gave brilliant young officers (like > the four-star-general officer who eulogized him) an opportunity to sit for a > couple of years getting smart. He did not mind investing in some intellectual > drilling that yielded only dry holes, because he knew that that was the price > of exploration. And, in a lesson to all self-important people, if he thought > you might possibly have something to say, he would sit and listen to you no > matter how old you were, where you went to school, or what your status was. > > St. Andrew’s Prep may have some reunions (there is a foundation named after > Andy), but he was the centripetal force that held it together. That is fine; > he knew that nothing lasts forever, and that it was time for others to do his > kind of mentoring, exploring, and inquiring about what makes the world of > strategy spin. He left behind webs of friendship and connection, and an > American tradition of strategic thinking that will live well beyond him. > > In recent years, grim-faced or obsequious Russian and Chinese officers came > to Washington seeking the mysterious secrets of the impassive brain of the > Pentagon. They had pored over every reference to him (not many) in the press, > and sought the hidden mysteries in his still scantier writings. They knew > that he had anticipated the transformative effects of the information > revolution on warfare, and wondered what he saw coming next. They would have > loved to have purloined and secretly photographed the folder covered with > security stamps labeled “The Really Big Secrets of Net Assessment.” > > It does not exist, of course, though they will not believe it. They may never > understand that his real secret was that of a roving mind and a patient > intellect, married to the spirit of a masterly teacher and generous friend. > If they only knew it, they would realize that the real secret to Andy > Marshall’s success could begin to be found in the broad smiles and loud > laughs as St. Andrew’s Prep celebrated its times with its wise mentor, the > kindly, not entirely inscrutable brain of the Pentagon. > > By Eliot A. Cohen // Eliot A. Cohen is the director of the Strategic Studies > Program at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International > Studies. From 2007 to 2009, he served as counselor to Secretary of State > Condoleezza Rice. He is the author of "The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft > Power and the Necessity of Military Force." > > >
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