OpenBSD�s Theo de Raadt talks software security

Rodney Gedda , Computerworld
http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;1498222899;fp;16;fpid;0

10/09/2004 09:17:59

With security the focus of this year�s Australian Unix Users Group (AUUG)
conference, OpenBSD founder and project lead Theo de Raadt was invited to
speak on exploit mitigation techniques. In an exclusive interview with
Computerworld's Rodney Gedda, the man behind an operating system that lays
claim to only one remote exploit in the default install in seven years,
reveals where we are headed � and how far we have to go � in the search for
more secure software

What are some of the things that the software industry today is neglecting
or ignoring in terms of security and why do we have some many security
problems?

Almost all the security problems that happen in software, like probably 95
percent of them, are low-level programmer errors. What happens is people are
misusing program functions; they think they know how to use them but they�re
making very, very dumb errors and very small errors. These are things that
we�ve been getting away with forever. The things that people learn from
these things are copied by people reading code. These erroneous paradigms
are being copied into newer pieces of code over, and over, and over. So now
with the open source community and the close source community, we are faced
with, let�s say billions of lines of source code, all written by people who
have made the same paradigm errors and passed them on to the next program.
That�s why we have security holes. An attacker is using the unintended
side-effect of a bug, and since he understands them, he takes the unintended
side-effects and twists them to give him privilege. He gets himself
privilege because the machine behaves so regularly.

The attacker is always going to know how to do this. The only way we can
solve this is by making the environment harsh or by fixing the bugs. And we
know that fixing the bugs is never going to happen when we�re talking
billions of lines of code. We�ve been trying for a while to do that. That�s
why we are having all the security problems.

Why will we continue to have these security problems? There are a bunch of
vendors out there that are not paying attention to security technologies,
which is helping.

They are not doing the security audits that are required, they�re not doing
the education, and they are not integrating very simple technologies which
effectively stump the attackers' attempts. The attacker still finds a bug
and still knows what the side-effects are, but the side-effects are in such
a strange environment that the attacker can�t gain ground and gain the
privileges he wants.

Are the vendors paying attention? No, they�re not. That�s all the Linuxes,
all the commercial Unixes, and Microsoft. Now, there are exceptions. There
are vendors who are starting to learn a bit. There are a few Linux variants
that have some copycat � that�s the wrong word for me to use but I�m going
to be honest. We�ve built so many technologies now that when we see one or
two small subsets of it show up we�re pretty clear about it � having been
doing it for five or six years now � that people have seen what we�ve done
and they do something similar.

In the game of security cat and mouse, is OpenBSD trying to think one or two
steps ahead?

We�ve seen in the wild, people who are not running OpenBSD boxes but are
making them look like OpenBSD boxes because it will immediately make an
attacker say: �it�s a waste of my time�.

But we are moving into a new world where attackers aren�t looking at what
they�re attacking. Attackers basically troll the entire Internet with a
known attack and they come back a week later and see what they�ve collected.
People are trying to break into machines and turn them into zombies and
there�s an entire industry providing them for spammers, etc. So we�re in a
different field.

The way I look at security is that my security depends on your security
because every single insecure machine on the Internet becomes a machine that
can send me spam. These machines can be broken into to do a
denial-of-service against me and take down my T1. And in a model like that
we have to secure the entire Internet; that�s the main target. Perhaps
that�s a little too visionary.

For example, 65 percent of Cisco�s products ships with OpenSSH included.
Cisco has its own SSH implementation for some of its IOS routers but as the
CPU power of their routers increases it removed its own SSH and put ours on
it. And I can�t think of a free or commercial Unix that doesn�t have it.
This is a software monopoly but at least it was written by people who care
about security, so it�s not like Microsoft�s monopoly. The benefit is that
over three years we essentially killed Telnet and that�s a good thing. It
even gets weird, there are now 12 mobile phones available with OpenSSH.

Do you think Microsoft is learning from the open source community?

Unfortunately Microsoft security problems have nothing to do with Unix
security problems. Microsoft�s security problems have to do with its Web
client which probably has 300 to 500 vulnerabilities in it which a firewall
will never block as they are all in http, all inside a TCP session and a
packet filter does not help you. And when you get to some of the more
obscure things like the way it does ActiveX and the way it does cookie
handling and the way it does zones. These things are a continual trap for
the company and all the security knowledge that is protecting us in the Unix
world is useless for it. It is still going to be providing everyone with
crap code, so if you�re going to keep on providing crap, then the protection
technology is going to be their only saving grace, the only thing that is
going to help. That�s what I think it has to do but I don�t think it is
really paying attention. For example, its entire NX effort, the reliance on
AMD64 PAE NX, is a mockery of what is possible because it is only protecting
some parts of the address space so buffer overflows are still possible.

A lot of people compare open source versus closed models of security. What�s
your opinion on this?

People ask this thing often and they mention source but they don�t say which
source. Inside the Unix space there are two parts of the operating system,
there�s the operating system and then there�s the stuff you run on it. Well,
there isn�t really a question anymore of open source versus closed source
for the application. Everyone who runs an application is stuck with an open
source application or a closed source application.

For the operating system, a proprietary Unix or open Unix, it comes down to
craftsmanship and realities on the floor. And I don�t think anybody is doing
anything better than anybody else. Some of the projects are good in some
ways and terrible in other ways. The source code doesn�t make a difference.
You can get the source code for anything today and an attacker can find
vulnerabilities. The fact of the matter is, there is no more closed source
there is just limited open source. 


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