Hi Raj,

>> => This is quite confused. Device authentication and SA negotiation is most
>> separated today from MIPv6 signalling as it is done with other protocols and
>> is least separated with 4285, which piggybacks it on MIPv6 signalling.
> 
> 4285 relies on the MN and HA obtaining keys via an out-of-band mechanism
> (which for all practical purposes is access network specific). So I disagree
> that 4285 relies on MIP6 signaling for key exchange. 4285 simply uses the
> keys to compute the authenticator that is carried in the BU. So I don't see
> how you believe that 4285 is more tightly coupled than IPsec/IKE.

=> Well, both mechanisms don't couple key exchange with MIPv6, but 4285 uses
a MIPv6 option to authenticate the messages whereas IPsec doesn't. So 4285
is more coupled to MIPv6 than IPsec. 4285 can't be used with any other
protocol so I'm not sure why you don't think it's tightly coupled to MIPv6.

Hesham

> 
> -Raj
> 
>> If
>> you're for separation then your support for 4285-like mechanisms confuses
>> me. Your statement above is a justification for the exact opposite of what
>> you're asking us to consider.
>> 
>> Hesham
>> 
>>> 
>>> -Raj
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 3/3/10 7:55 AM, "basavaraj.pa...@nokia.com" <basavaraj.pa...@nokia.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> While there are many reasons that can be attributed to the lack of
>>>>> implementations and use, one that I would like to raise is the the
>>>>> concern with the overly complex security model that MIP6/DSMIP6 relies
>>>>> on today. MIP6/DSMIP6 requires IPsec and IKE/IKEv2 (RFC3776/4877) to
>>>>> secure the signaling between the MN and HA. The fundamental purpose of
>>>>> MIP6/DSMIP6 is to provide mobility to hosts. At a very high level the
>>>>> MIP6/DSMIP6 protocol boils down to the ability to setup a tunnel
>>>>> between the MN and HA and update the MN tunnel end-point whenever
>>>>> there is a change in the associated IP address (CoA). The signaling to
>>>>> establish the tunnel needs to be secure. But using a protocol like
>>>>> IKEv2 and IPsec to achieve this security is just an overkill.
>>>> 
>>>> Well, it has its advantages too. Being able to connect to the home agent
>>>> from an unsecure WiFi access is one of them.
>>>> 
>>>> Vijay
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> MEXT mailing list
>>> m...@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mext
>> 
>> 
> 


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