Why the history value is precisely 64bit long? I suggest it to be
variable length.
another point is the following:
Code was also developed to attempt to brute force log entries, and it
was noted that on the same PC used for the testing above (single CPU
PC with an Intel Core i7 running at 2.8GHz) attempting to brute force
a single log entry would be computationally infeasible (approximately
22,313,257 years required). To decrypt the entire log would require
this same amount of time for each individual log entry.
This part is interesting. I would rather conclude the paragraph with
saying that the number of years required may be dramatically reduced by
improving the algorithmic method to take advantage of local core
multiplicity, near range IoT computing power availability and
Internet-scale computing.
Alex
Le 28/05/2018 à 23:19, Dave O'Reilly a écrit :
Dear all,
Further to our recent discussion about draft-daveor-cgn-logging, I mentioned
that I was working on another draft wherein I was hoping to present a concept
that illustrates that the requirement for individual privacy and the
requirement for retaining data for crime attribution purposes are not
necessarily inherently in conflict with each other. I have finished the
document, which is now available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-daveor-slaac-privacy-logging/
It’s an early draft but I would be very interested in any feedback from anyone
who has the time or inclination to review the document.
Best regards,
daveor
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