Hello Jun

While I agree that the snooping behavior allows operations without changing 
protocols and that is a real plus, experience from the real world proves you 
wrong on the robustness of snooping in WLANs. Ap ND has benefits to WiFi too. 
The future will say if it gets adopted there or not.

 My ask is that you indicate exactly the above:
- snooping may not be able to track rapid movements and may miss some for a 
while
-We can have a better reliability but that requires a protocol change; for this 
a pointer on AP ND is useful.
- in the meantime snooping is deployed and people should be aware of it


Regards,

Pascal

Le 4 nov. 2018 à 20:34, Jun Bi 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :


Dear Pascal,

Many Thanks for your review comment !
Please see the reply below and the attached draft revision version.

Best Regards,
Jun Bi



Comments from Pascal Thubert


I agree with Lorenzo, this scheme is at a high level what we can find in 
commercial products, and I have first-hand experience on that.

As an informational document, this RFC could be a useful reference to consider 
if we were to change the protocols in a way that would impact those existing 
and non-standard snooping behaviors.

Snooping has proven to be very useful, but as one may guess, it is not 
reliable; it may miss packets, may fail to create bindings, may point on an 
incorrect location as well.

So I’d say that if we publish as RFC, we should also indicate that with 
draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd, we (will) have a more robust solution for devices that 
are willing to announce themselves.


Reply:

  Thank you for your comment. Regarding reliability issues of snooping in our 
case like DAD packet loss, please see responses to Lorenzo above.

  While draft-ietf-6lo-ap-nd proposes a security solution for low-power and 
lossy network (LLN), we focus on WLAN networks in this draft. WLAN network is 
much more stable than     LLN. And with solutions proposed for handling DAD 
message loss, the draft gives a mechanisms that is robust enough for source 
address validation in WLAN networks.

  Also, the proposed solution doesn’t affect existing protocols nor does it 
require any modifications to existing protocols.

<draft-bi-savi-wlan-16(1).txt>
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