El 13/10/2006, a las 9:57, Christian Vogt escribió:
the second and the third paragraph in section 3.1. describes how a
downgrading attack would work and the rest of the section presents
different approachs that would not be vulnerable to those attacks and
selects one among them. Do you think that more text is needed about
downgrading attack?
Hi Marcelo,
actually, I do, because the conclusion from the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs
in section 3.1 is that downgrading can be prevented by encoding the
hash
function into the CGA (rather than specifying it as part of the CGA
parameters). But this is true only under the assumption that no two
encodings can be valid at the same time.
You may say that this is a matter of course (which I actually do agree
with). But it may not be so obvious for everyone who reads the
document
or even writes the CGA software. It's my personal feeling that the
document should explicitly mention that CGA implementations must always
be limited to a single meaning per Sec value.
ok i see your point and i don't have a strong preference w.r.t.
including or not including a comment about this issue.
If anyone else has an opinion on this it would be nice to hear about it.
Regards, marcelo
Regards,
- Christian
--
Christian Vogt, Institute of Telematics, Universitaet Karlsruhe (TH)
www.tm.uka.de/~chvogt/pubkey/
marcelo bagnulo braun wrote:
El 12/10/2006, a las 12:41, Christian Vogt escribió:
Hmm, the document first describes the deficiencies of today's CGA
and then provides a solution. The Security Considerations section
typically discusses any remaining security issues with the
solution, or it explains why a typical threat that people might be
concerned about does not apply. Since downbidding is such a
typical threat, I thought that the Security Considerations should
explain why the proposed solution is not vulnerable to it. But
it's totally fine if you put the explanation elsewhere if that
works better with the current draft structure.
the second and the third paragraph in section 3.1. describes how a
downgrading attack would work and the rest of the section presents
different approachs that would not be vulnerable to those attacks and
selects one among them. Do you think that more text is needed about
downgrading attack?
Regards, marcelo
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