On 2/28/25 18:17, Simon Horman wrote:
On Tue, Feb 25, 2025 at 10:08:49AM +0100, Martyna Szapar-Mudlaw wrote:
From: Mateusz Polchlopek <[email protected]>
Fix using the untrusted value of proto->raw.pkt_len in function
ice_vc_fdir_parse_raw() by verifying if it does not exceed the
VIRTCHNL_MAX_SIZE_RAW_PACKET value.
Fixes: 99f419df8a5c ("ice: enable FDIR filters from raw binary patterns for
VFs")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martyna Szapar-Mudlaw <[email protected]>
---
.../ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_fdir.c | 25 +++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_fdir.c
b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_fdir.c
index 14e3f0f89c78..6250629ee8f9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_fdir.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_fdir.c
@@ -835,18 +835,27 @@ ice_vc_fdir_parse_raw(struct ice_vf *vf,
u8 *pkt_buf, *msk_buf __free(kfree);
struct ice_parser_result rslt;
struct ice_pf *pf = vf->pf;
+ u16 pkt_len, udp_port = 0;
struct ice_parser *psr;
int status = -ENOMEM;
struct ice_hw *hw;
- u16 udp_port = 0;
- pkt_buf = kzalloc(proto->raw.pkt_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- msk_buf = kzalloc(proto->raw.pkt_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!proto->raw.pkt_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
Hi Martyna,
It seems to me that the use of __free() above will result in
kfree(msk_buf) being called here. But msk_buf is not initialised at this
point.
My suggest would be to drop the use of __free().
But if not, I think that in order to be safe it would be best to do this
(completely untested;
u8 *pkt_buf, *msk_buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
Oh yeah!, thank you Simon for catching that.
I would say "naked __free()" was harmful here.
