In light of the recent supply chain attack in xz/lzma, leading to a backdoor in openSSH (https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/29/4), I believe that it would be a good idea to remove the huge attack surface offered by the pre-generated autoconf build scripts and lexers, offered in the release tarballs.
In particular, the xz supply chain attack injected the exploit with a few obfuscated lines, manually added to the end of the pre-generated configure script, that was only bundled in the tarballs. Even if the exploits themselves were committed to the repo in the form of test files, the code that actually injected the exploit in the library was not committed to the repo, and was only present in the pre-generated configure script in the tarball: this injection mode makes sense, as extra files in the tarball not present in the git repo would raise suspicions, but machine-generated configure scripts containing hundreds of thousands of lines of code not present in the upstream VCS are the norm, and are usually not checked before execution. Specifically in the case of PHP, along from the configure script, the tarball also bundles generated lexer files which contain actual C code, which is an additional attack vector, i.e. here's the diff between the tarball of the 8.3.4 release, and the PHP-8.3.4 tag on the git repo: ``` ~ $ diff -r php-8.3.4 php-src -q Only in php-src: .git Files php-8.3.4/NEWS and php-src/NEWS differ Files php-8.3.4/Zend/zend.h and php-src/Zend/zend.h differ Only in php-8.3.4/Zend: zend_ini_parser.c Only in php-8.3.4/Zend: zend_ini_parser.h Only in php-8.3.4/Zend: zend_ini_parser.output Only in php-8.3.4/Zend: zend_ini_scanner.c Only in php-8.3.4/Zend: zend_ini_scanner_defs.h Only in php-8.3.4/Zend: zend_language_parser.c Only in php-8.3.4/Zend: zend_language_parser.h Only in php-8.3.4/Zend: zend_language_parser.output Only in php-8.3.4/Zend: zend_language_scanner.c Only in php-8.3.4/Zend: zend_language_scanner_defs.h Only in php-8.3.4: configure Files php-8.3.4/configure.ac and php-src/configure.ac differ Only in php-8.3.4/ext/json: json_parser.tab.c Only in php-8.3.4/ext/json: json_parser.tab.h Only in php-8.3.4/ext/json: json_scanner.c Only in php-8.3.4/ext/json: php_json_scanner_defs.h Only in php-8.3.4/ext/pdo: pdo_sql_parser.c Only in php-8.3.4/ext/phar: phar_path_check.c Only in php-8.3.4/ext/standard: url_scanner_ex.c Only in php-8.3.4/ext/standard: var_unserializer.c Only in php-8.3.4/main: php_config.h.in Files php-8.3.4/main/php_version.h and php-src/main/php_version.h differ Only in php-8.3.4/pear: install-pear-nozlib.phar Only in php-8.3.4/sapi/phpdbg: phpdbg_lexer.c Only in php-8.3.4/sapi/phpdbg: phpdbg_parser.c Only in php-8.3.4/sapi/phpdbg: phpdbg_parser.h Only in php-8.3.4/sapi/phpdbg: phpdbg_parser.output ``` To prevent attacks from malevolent/compromised RMs, I propose completely removing all autogenerated files from the release tarballs, and ensuring their content exactly matches the content of the associated git tag (this means also removing the -dev prefix from the version number in main/php_version.h, Zend/zend.h, configure.ac and NEWS in the git tag). Of course this means that users will have to generate the build scripts when compiling PHP, as when installing PHP from the VCS repo. I'm sending a copy of this email to secur...@php.net as well.
