http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NB25Ak01.html
Feb 25, 2012
SPEAKING FREELY
Saudis embrace China in new polygamy
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Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former ambassador Saudi ambassador to the United
States once called the US-Saudi relationship a "Catholic marriage". When the
remark was uttered in the 1990s it was a view common in both Riyadh and
Washington. The US-Saudi alliance had just capped two major victories, one over
Saddam's Iraq and the other over the Soviets in Afghanistan.
victories, one over Saddam's Iraq and the other over the Soviets in
Afghanistan.
That was an era of good feeling, so much so that American officials took to
calling the Saudi envoy "Bandar the Magnificent". However as the past decade
has shown in glaring detail, it was not a lasting sentiment. The September 11
attacks can be easily identified as the demarcating line in the US-Saudi
relationship. Following the identification of 15 of the 19 hijackers, and the
mastermind Osama bin Laden, as Saudi nationals, a hitherto unheard of level of
US attention was turned on the sensitive topics of Saudi society and domestic
political reform.
The friction resulting from this was compounded by the expanding "war on
terror", disagreements over Palestinian policy, and finally and perhaps most
severely the decision by the George W Bush administration to invade Iraq. It
was the culmination of these factors that led an exasperated Prince Saud
al-Faisal to amend his brothers remarks to state that the US-Saudi relationship
was not a "Catholic marriage" but in fact a "Muslim marriage".
The warning was remarkably clear, as Islam allows for up to four marriages the
US was to be on notice that Saudi Arabia could and would pursue other major
power relationships. Whither to go? Rapprochement with Russia was swiftly
discounted as Russia took up positions behind the Tehran-Damascus axis, while
Europe was both too close to the United States and too weak. The logical
conclusion led Saudi envoys to Beijing. As a mutually autocratic state with
little interest in Saudi domestic reforms and a power on the rise, China was an
obvious and attractive option to pursue.
Saudi Arabia was on familiar ground in China. The kingdom's relationship with
Beijing dated back to the 1980s, when Beijing acted as a clearinghouse for arms
headed for Afghanistan and as an increasingly hungry customer for Saudi crude.
The first signs that a Sino-Saudi relationship could bear strategic fruit came
in 1988 when Saudi Arabia purchased 36 CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic
missiles, and nine launchers.
The sale was extremely controversial as the missiles have little utility as
conventional weapons and are geared towards use as weapons of mass destruction
platforms. Upon discovery of the sale the Bush administration began a series of
frantic calls to Riyadh to try and dissuade the Saudi's from the "reckless"
arms adventure. American worries fell on deaf ears, and aside from assurances
that Saudi Arabia had no nuclear intentions, their concerns were rejected. Thus
the appealing prospect of an unfussy Chinese ally was piqued in Riyadh.
Though the relationship had grown in the 1990s with the signing of bilateral
trade agreements, ministerial exchanges, and increasing trade volume, the real
shift began in 2006. In a remarkable turnaround from the days when Chinese
communists could not even step foot in the kingdom, King Abdullah made an
official state visit to Beijing.
One of the major issues highlighted, likely to the discomfiture of Washington,
was the maintenance of regional peace and energy security, a sphere normally
reserved to the US-Saudi relationship. The trip was soon reciprocated with a
state visit to Riyadh by Chinese President Hu Jintao, cementing the shift in
the Sino-Saudi relationship.
In early 2011, Saudi Arabia was faced with the growing tremors of the Arab
Spring and an increasingly aggressive Iran on their strategic periphery. In
quick succession Saudi Arabia faced the collapse of Hosni Mubarak's regime in
Egypt, the disintegration of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime in Yemen, and the
prospect of an overthrow of the al-Khalifa monarchy in Bahrain.
The kingdom's first instinct was to try to contain the damage and stop the
spread of democratic contagion. However when it turned to the United States for
assistance, or at least acquiescence, it found an unsympathetic ear. The US
opposed Saudi attempts to buttress the Mubarak regime, with ties fraying so
much that Riyadh offered to match US aid dollar for dollar if it was cut.
Following the collapse of Mubarak's regime and the lack of support from the US,
the Saudi's blatantly ignored the United States and sent troops into Bahrain to
stymie street protests and fortify a critical ally.
There is much evidence that Riyadh has been scarred by this experience. When
Saudi Arabia felt like it needed US support the most, it's liberal concerns
inhibited its ability to act and in many cases set the US in opposition to the
Kingdom. The Saudi's canceled a series of planned visits by US diplomats in
mid-February, and rebuffed attempts to set up meetings in March, only in April
did the Saudi's agree to a meeting with then US defense secretary Robert Gates.
The meeting was chilly by all accounts, and Washington has been endeavoring
ever since to repair the ruptures in the relationship. However at the same time
that Washington was trying to get its diplomats through the doors of the
palace, Saudi Arabia had dispatched its own envoys to China.
In a tag team maneuver King Abdullah sent long time American ambassador Prince
Bandar and his successor Prince Turki al-Faisal on a series of meetings to
Beijing. The result has been a steady series of energy, trade, and security
agreements. As recently as a month ago Saudi Arabia and China inked a major
civil nuclear cooperation agreement that has heralded much speculation about
the future of Saudi nuclear ambitions and the extent of Chinese cooperation.
While in the backdrop of the escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf and
increasing economic pressure on Iran, the Saudi's have been engaging in a
mini-version of shuttle diplomacy with China. Earlier this month the Saudi's
assured Asian oil partners, but China in particular, that Saudi Arabia's
reserve production capacity was more than enough to cover an Iranian shortfall.
The goal being to leverage China from its protective stance over Iran, and join
in the oil embargo or at least not impede further action by the United Nations
Security Council.
The flowering of the Sino-Saudi relationship has been remarkable both for its
rapidity and the depth of some its connections. However, there are significant
stumbling blocks for the development of a permanent alliance, and questions
over what the goals of the relationship are. At the end of the day Saudi Arabia
is still incredibly dependent upon the United States and the Western powers for
its security guarantee.
This is easily evidenced by the quantity of US bases in the region, the
willingness of the US to deploy significant assets to the Gulf, and of course
the nearly US$60 billion arms deal announced late last year. There is also a
relative confluence of policy aims between Saudi Arabia and the United States
over Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, something not evident with Beijing especially in
light over their veto of the United Nations security council resolution on
Syria.
Indeed, it could be said that a growing Sino-Saudi relationship could reap
dividends for the United States in the short to medium term. If Saudi Arabia
can use its oil weight to leverage China out of its protective embrace of Iran,
or to abandon its objections to a Syria intervention, Washington would uncork
some champagne bottles. The use of Saudi crude to effect a more cooperative
outlook on regional policy would be a major coup, and is a clear goal of the
current diplomatic offensive by Riyadh.
The real danger for the United States, and where Saudi Arabia may be hedging
its bets, is in the long term. As Chinese power rises and it may in the coming
decades become a viable replacement for the US security guarantee. This would
afford Riyadh with what it has always dreamed of, a powerful and compliant
protector. An alliance of the autocrats would relieve Saudi Arabia of the
ceaseless pressures to reform, to end crackdowns, and to restrain its foreign
policy - returning those decisions exclusively to the royal court instead.
More immediately, the decision to forge ties with China may serve as a hedge
against current pressures from the United States. Washington may not want to
push the envelope with Saudi Arabia, if it believes it will push the al-Saud
further into the Chinese orbit. This gives Riyadh wiggle room in its
relationship with the United States, and gives China a risk free way to
influence US regional policy objectives.
Saudi Arabia has never had a duality in its foreign relations, it has been
tethered to the United States virtually since the modern state was founded in
the early 1930s, a relationship cemented by a state visit from President
Roosevelt in 1945. The creation of a countervailing force with China as an ally
is a new game for Saudi Arabia, and a relatively new one for China as well. It
is also proving to be an increasingly useful tool for both, and will likely
define the regional dynamic in the coming decade.
Joshua Jacobs is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Institute for Gulf Affairs.
His analyses have been featured on domestic media outlets in North Africa and
the Middle Eas
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