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A New Security Order in the Pacific
Written by Khanh Vu Duc
Friday, 01 June 2012
A new organization must be formed to address the region's present and future
concerns
The United States today is not the United States of 1962, financially sound and
brimming with potential. Despite its best efforts, Washington will find itself
hard pressed to find a manageable solution to the plethora of problems that
plague the South China Sea.
Faced with a debt crisis and stubborn unemployment levels at home, exhausted
militarily and economically from campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US must
temper its foreign policy objectives in this period of austerity. No longer can
the US be expected to provide economic and military support to its traditional
allies.
Despite an expected reduction in force—almost US$500 billion and perhaps more
in planned defense spending cuts over the next decade—it is unlikely the US
would withdraw completely from its commitments in Asia-Pacific or around the
world, but its ability to execute foreign policy will be much diminished.
To reflect the changing geopolitics, there is a need for a new security order
in the Pacific. It is clear that the US maintains an interest in Asia-Pacific
but can no longer play the same role it was once capable of. Countries in the
region must assume responsibility over their security. However, this new
security order should not omit the United States by counting it out
permanently, but take into account its new role.
By thrusting the bulk of responsibility onto the shoulders of Asian countries,
with the hopes that such an order would provide relevant, regional-specific
solutions to regional matters, the new security order would exist as an
international forum and security alliance, providing the methods and means to
resolve disputes before they could devolve into conflicts.
Common Interests, Shared Responsibility
The desire for an Asia-Pacific at peace is undoubtedly shared by all regional
countries. Regardless of China’s assertiveness, not even they would seek
conflict when it can be avoided. In this, all parties in this new security
order could find common ground: to establish mechanisms that would preserve
peace and security, and give way to prosperity.
While the United States’ pivot to the Asia-Pacific has included Marines in
Australia and increased naval exercises with allies and strategic partners in
the region, it cannot be expected that the US Navy will provide an umbrella of
protection for all those in need. Ultimately, of the Southeast Asian nations,
only the Philippines are assured protection under its Mutual Defense Treaty
with the US. As such, other Southeast Asian nations must adapt to a reality in
which American assistance is not always assured. Southeast Asian nations must
not assume that the US will play an absolute role.
What would a new security order in Asia-Pacific look like? It would have,
perhaps, Japan, India, and Australia as perimeter nations, and at its core
comprise of the US and Southeast Asian. This alliance—the Pacific Security
Organization, or PSO, as it will be referred from here on—would serve as the
new security order in Asia-Pacific. The US would continue to play an important
role, but leadership of the organization would (and should) be assigned to a
member of ASEAN, whose presence and interests are relevant to other ASEAN and
regional partners.
For obvious reasons, Japan, India, and Australia, none of whom are ASEAN
states, are unlikely to be leaders of this new order. History has not endeared
Japan to the hearts and minds of its neighbors. India is too far removed from
Southeast Asia; and Australia, however economically sound, may be excluded for
similar reasons as India.
Indonesia, possessing the largest economy and population in Southeast Asia, is
a reasonable contender for a leadership role in the security order. It is
sometimes perceived as a natural leader in ASEAN due to its size and strength,
and so might be well-received as a leader among future member nations of the
PSO.
If Indonesia should seek a leadership role, it is likely to receive the nod
from the US. In his remarks to American Forces Press Service, General Martin E.
Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked that an Asian-Pacific
organization similar to NATO would have value; however, it must be demanded by
those nations. There is need for such an organization, but no country has yet
taken the initiative to create one. Indonesia is well placed to spearhead the
creation of the PSO.
>From its inception, the Pacific Security Organization must not be an American
>creation. The organization must be, at every level, an organization by
>Southeast Asian nations for Southeast Asian nations, in order to appropriately
>address concerns in the region. This would therefore entail member states of
>the PSO to assume all responsibility for their security and commitment to
>other party states. Over time, the PSO can evolve to encompass all of
>Asia-Pacific, but only after it has succeeded in securing peace in Southeast
>Asia.
The United States, of course, would remain an integral part of the
organization, but it should not be looked upon to provide all the answers. In
this period of austerity, the US military is in the process reorganizing its
priorities and restructuring its forces. If it is to play any role in
Asia-Pacific, the US must require its allies and strategic partners to assume
some responsibility in securing their respective interests. The establishment
of the PSO would allow Southeast Asian nations, formally dependent on US
protection, to look to themselves to strengthen and improve their security.
Challenges and Opportunities Ahead
Undoubtedly there will be many challenges facing the establishment of this new
security order; however, all the same, there will equally be many benefits.
Challenges are merely opportunities yet discovered; and although the challenges
are immediate and benefits distant, if not nebulous, this should in no way
discourage any attempt at formalizing a new security order. The greatest
opportunity of all is the stabilization the Pacific. If this century should be
the “Pacific Century,” it would be better that the Pacific be free of conflict.
A new security order is crucial to delivering and maintaining said peace and
prosperity. The most pressing matter at hand is not only assembling the
countries to be involved, but also organizing them among common grounds. As
stated earlier, although these countries share a common interest, their
differences are many; and it may be that these differences prevent the creation
of a new security order.
Overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea, for example, could
scuttle the PSO before it can take off. Almost all claimant states in the
Spratly Island disputes have overlapping claims. Past grievances between
countries may also be too much to bear moving forward. Whatever the challenges,
however, it must be made clear to potential parties that there is much to be
gained by putting aside these differences.
Beyond peace and security in the Pacific, this new, international security
forum could strengthen ties between East and West. Much like NATO can be used
to address, discuss, and attempt to solve security concerns before they erupt,
this Asian-Pacific security organization can do the same. The potential for the
South China Sea territorial disputes to devolve into conflict looms in the
distance. At present, it seems unlikely that any claimant country will start a
war over the disputes; however, would it not be better to resolve this matter
now rather than wait and find out later? ASEAN has thus far proved lacking in
finding an acceptable solution to this problem. It may be that a new forum with
the proper mandate is required to resolve the disputes.
Vietnam’s Dilemma
Of the ASEAN countries that might join the new security alliance, Vietnam
proves to be the most interesting, equally important and unimportant.
Possessing a mid-size economy among Southeast Asian nations, a fairly young and
large population, and a modernizing military, its addition to the PSO would
certainly be welcomed.
Vietnam, however, has the unfortunate circumstance of being an historic rival
of China; yet, despite this, remains deeply tied to the latter. Vietnam’s
economy is dependent on China, as is the legitimacy of its government. Both are
Communist (in name more than philosophy), but where the rule of China’s
Communist Party is absolute, Vietnam’s is on the precipice. Internal divisions
have strained the Vietnamese Communist Party, with some party members perhaps
advocating closer ties with the United States, with others demanding the party
and country remain close to China.
Warming up to the US would allow greater access to Western markets, but at the
cost of necessary political reforms (human rights remains a sore point between
the US and Vietnam, especially with respect to sales of arms) and potential
economic retaliation from China. On the other hand, falling in line with China
would assure Vietnam that its immediate economic and security concerns would be
taken care of; however, the Vietnamese people have yet to openly accept China,
viewing their northern neighbor with distrust.
Moreover, Vietnam and China are presently involved in the Spratly and Paracel
Islands disputes, which have been a point of contention greater than Vietnam’s
reluctance to address its human rights problems. The Vietnamese government has
so far been walking a fine line between satisfying China and the US while
maintaining Communist rule, but it cannot do so forever.
The United States would like Vietnam to join an organization like the PSO, if
only to secure another strategic partner so close to China. Should Vietnam not
join the alliance, it would not amount to a catastrophic loss to the US. It
would, however, be a grave loss to the PSO. While not possessing the same
international clout as Singapore or Indonesia, its relatively young and large
labor population would contribute greatly over time, not only to Vietnam, but
to Southeast Asian economies. As a member of the PSO, Vietnam would have the
ability to develop closer economic ties with its neighbors on a multilateral
basis.
That said, Vietnam as is would not be an ideal partner in the PSO, as its
treatment of its citizens leaves much to be desired. Not to restrict this
concern to Vietnam only, it should be a requirement for all future member
states of the PSO to improve conditions at home, so as not to undermine the
integrity of the organization. In the case of Vietnam, it must democratize and
address its human rights violations. The PSO should not only promote and secure
peace and security in Asia-Pacific, but promote better standards of living.
(Khanh Vu Duc is a Vietnamese Canadian lawyer in Ottawa, focusing on various
areas of law. He researches on International Relations and International Law)
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