.http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NH31Ae01.html

Aug 31, 2012

Indonesia short of naval muscle
By Vignesh Ram 

Southeast Asia was an important front line in the United States-led fight 
against communism during the Cold War. That emphasis impacted on the foreign 
policies of many regional countries, including Indonesia, which emerged from a 
post-independence period of left-leaning nationalism to become one of the US's 
key counter-communism allies. 

Now, Indonesia is emerging again as a crucial player as US foreign policy 
"pivots" towards Asia, a geostrategic shift aimed at counterbalancing China's 
rising power in the region. The geographical location of the sprawling 
archipelago, through which the majority of the world's trade flows, includes a 
strategic chokepoint at the Malacca Strait for China's energy imports in a 
potential conflict with the US. 

China has acknowledged this risk as its "Malacca dilemma", forcing its 
strategic planners to look for alternate routes for his fuel supplies, 
including a planned pipeline through Myanmar. Many analysts view China's 
growing assertiveness in the potentially oil and gas rich South China Sea as 
indication of its desire to secure energy sources in the region and mitigate 
its dependence on distant Middle Eastern imports. 

Whether Indonesia would be willing to play such a role in a potential conflict 
is a wild card. Even if it were so inclined, its not clear to strategic 
analysts that it would have the capacity to project such power due to years of 
under-spending on defense, including for crucial naval capabilities. 

The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis brought about significant geopolitical 
changes in the region, including the end of more than three decades of 
authoritarian rule in Indonesia. The crisis also pushed Indonesia into a period 
of chaos that eventually reshaped its politics, seen today in President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono's more democratic order and outward looking foreign policy. 

To recover from the economic and financial crisis, it was essential that trade 
and commerce experienced no hindrances as the country bid to export its way 
back to economic health. The safety and security of nearby sea lanes, long 
prone to piracy of global shipments, became more important to ensure smooth 
trade and later took on new significance in the context of the US-led global 
war on terrorism. 

This was one of the areas sought out by external powers, including the US, to 
assert greater influence over the region's strategic order. However, strong 
opposition by mainly Indonesia and Malaysia kept external players at bay as 
they tried to find a regional solution to the piracy problem. 

In 2004, what emerged was MALSINDO (an acronym made of the initials of 
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) which engaged in joint operations to combat 
piracy in their strategic waterways. Though the exercises were publicly 
portrayed as a success, doubts remained as to how far they could be stretched 
within existing trilateral frameworks and how much the countries were willing 
to allocate financially. 

These joint operations raised some important questions about the capabilities 
of Indonesia to project power in the region in relation to its size. Indonesia 
is a huge country of over 17,000 islands, stretching near to the Indian Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands in the east, to the northern Australian coast to the south, 
and to the north towards the furthest southern reaches of the Philippines. 

Indonesia is thus a major part of the geography, and a key driver of the 
geopolitics, of Southeast Asia. Yet its power projection capabilities remain 
geographically asymmetrical. The Indonesian navy (TNI AL) has been slowly but 
steadily increasingly its procurements and spending, which are expected to rise 
to US$8.1 billion in 2012-13 from US$7 billion in 2011-12. 

That is a small sum considering the country's vast territory and population - 
and rising geostrategic importance in the context of the US's pivot strategy. 
In comparison, smaller states in the region such as Singapore spend more. (The 
city-state has earmarked $12.3 billion for defense spending in 2012-13). 
Indonesia's outlays are also considerably less vis-a-vis larger countries such 
as India, which is set to spend around $40 billion on defense over the same 
period. 

Analysts believe Indonesia must beef up its naval forces if it is to maintain a 
strong and effective presence in the region, particularly in the context of 
China's economic and military rise. Jakarta carries out various joint exercises 
with neighboring countries such as India, which help to maintain cordial 
relations in the region but do not do enough to bolster its overall strategic 
position due to sensitivities over sovereignty. 

As one of the original founders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), Indonesia remains a strong proponent of keeping Southeast Asian 
regionalism intact. Its proactive role as last year's chair of ASEAN saw many 
regional successes, namely its mediating role in the Cambodia-Thailand conflict 
over the contested Preah Vihear temple area. Its active support for East Timor, 
formerly a part of Indonesia, to become an ASEAN member underlined the 
country's new role as a force for peace and stability in the region. 

Indonesia's peacemaker role was on display again in July when its Foreign 
Minister Marty Natalegawa engaged in "shuttle diplomacy" to resolve an 
intra-ASEAN rift that had broken out into the open during a foreign ministers' 
meeting held in Cambodia, by then the NATO chair. Member states had failed to 
reach a consensus and issue a final statement due to divisions over how to 
respond to China's growing assertiveness over contested territories in the 
South China Sea. 

That diplomatic role masks Indonesia's own strategic concerns about China. The 
two countries had turbulent relations during the Cold War period, aggravated by 
Indonesia's bloody purge of hundreds of thousands of communist sympathizers in 
the late 1960s. Relations were normalized in 1990, but a territorial dispute 
over the Natuna Islands kept relations on edge until 1995, when Beijing 
renounced its claim to the islands but not the nearby gas fields. 

Indonesia has quietly asserted its claim to the fields through joint 
development foreign energy companies, including from the United States. Unlike 
the situation of its ASEAN neighbors, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, 
who remain embroiled with China in disputes over the Spratly Islands and other 
island chains in the South China Sea, Indonesia's claim to the Natuna gas 
fields has gone largely unquestioned by China. 

On the diplomatic front, Indonesia now plays a key role in ensuring regional 
peace and stability and keeping ASEAN reasonably united amid pro-and anti-China 
sentiments among its member states. At the same time, the country is promoting 
its image as a mature and responsible world power, one that willingly 
cooperates and engages with all major global powers. 

To consolidate these positions and simultaneously demonstrate a credible 
deterrent to Chinese expansionism, Indonesia needs to bolster quickly and 
substantially its defensive capabilities. As tensions mount between China and 
other ASEAN states, and the US places new priority on Asian security, a strong 
and capable Indonesia represents the region's best hope for maintaining peace 
and stability. 

Vignesh Ram is a PhD research scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and 
International Relations at Manipal University, India. His areas of interest 
include Southeast Asia and its regional dynamics and, Indian foreign policy 
towards the region 

(Copyright 2012 Vignesh Ram

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