http://www.insideindonesia.org/current-edition/convenient-thugs
Convenient thugs
Published on Saturday, 11 August 2012 14:00
Written by Henky Widjaja
FPI thrives when mainstream Muslim groups remain silent
Henky Widjaja
FPI national head Habib Rizieq. Banner reads 'We are Indonesia! Neither
civil nor adat (customary) law will ever rival Allah's law'
Henky Widjaja
For the first time last year in Makassar, the Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI)
conducted raids on food outlets trading during daylight hours in the Islamic
fasting month. Raids during Ramadhan are not in themselves new. Another
organisation, Laskar Jundullah, launched a series of raids on hotels and
entertainment venues in the early 2000s. But these attacks on food outlets
marked FPI's emergence as South Sulawesi's leading Islamic paramilitary
organisation, and one that was more confident than its predecessors to
intervene in new areas of daily life.
Across Indonesia, many groups have long disapproved of FPI and their vigilante
attacks. When the group raided an interfaith gathering at the national monument
in Jakarta in 2008, former president Abdurrahman Wahid called for the group to
be disbanded. Most recently, adat (traditional culture) groups rejected FPI's
attempt to form a branch in the Central Kalimantan's capital city Palangkaraya,
a crowd gathering at the airport to ensure FPI leaders did not disembark from
their commercial flight. In Makassar, too, human rights groups and secular NGOs
organised large protests against FPI's vigilante attacks.
Yet the group continues to operate, and typically receives only a slap on the
wrist for its violent actions. FPI's national head, Habib Rizieq, received just
an 18 month sentence for inciting FPI members to carry out the national
monument attack. In Makassar, after their food stall attacks went unchallenged,
FPI attacked the provincial secretariat of Ahmadiyah, an Islamic sect that has
suffered violence and harassment across Indonesia. Only then did police arrest
FPI's provincial chief and two of his followers. The trio were sentenced only
to the five months they had already served in prison by the time of their
trial, a token punishment that saw the men immediately released.
To understand why FPI can operate as it does in Makassar, we need to examine
the attitudes of mainstream Islamic groups to the organisation. Amidst the
chorus of criticism of FPI in Makassar, these groups have remained noticeably
silent. Their silence reflects an unease regarding social ills that they share
with FPI, stemming from increased conservatism in society. When mainstream
groups feel the government is not acting on their concerns, FPI serves as a
convenient pressure group.
Following in Laskar Jundullah's footsteps
Since FPI established a branch in South Sulawesi in 2008, it has followed in
the footsteps of fellow Islamic militia Laskar Jundullah, doing best in
districts known to be Laskar Jundullah strongholds. Often, the two groups share
followers and supporters. In Bulukumba, for example, FPI established a branch
in February 2011. Soon after, the two groups came together in protest over a
decision by the district government to allow Catholics to conduct mass in the
disused former office of the district head. Minority religions are a common
target for FPI, who act as a leading pressure group to seek to prevent them
establishing places of worship, whether temporary or permanent.
Laskar Jundullah itself was established in 2000 as the paramilitary wing of the
South Sulawesi-based Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic
Law (KPPSI). KPPSI was a political front led by Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, one of the
sons of Kahar Muzakkar, a leader of a Darul-Islam rebellion in the 1950s and
1960s. KPPSI achieved some initial successes, inspiring many districts and
municipalities issued local regulations based on Shari’a. During the same
period, Laskar Jundullah reached the height of its influence. Headquartered in
Makassar, the militia also established branches in other municipalities and
districts. It was well-known for its violent acts, with political scientist
Michael Buehler observing that the militia serves as a kind of informal Shari’a
police force in many districts and also helps candidates in many district head
elections to intimidate their rivals.
But two rounds of arrests in 2002 marked Laskar Jundullah's downfall. First,
Laskar Jundullah's head Agus Dwikarna was arrested in the Philippines in 2002
in possession of explosives. Then eight Laskar Jundullah members were convicted
for the December 2002 Makassar bombings, which targeted a McDonalds restaurant
in the Jusuf Kalla-owned Ratu Indah Mall as well as a car dealership owned by
Kalla. One rumour suggested that Kalla, a KPPSI advisor, was attacked for not
delivering on a promise to help free Dwikarna. Another interpretation
maintained that Kalla was targeted because Laskar Jundullah disapproved of his
role in brokering the Malino peace accord in the Poso conflict, where the group
had sent fighters.
The bombings were a serious miscalculation on Laskar Jundullah's part. Elite
supporters abandoned the group, which was forced to scale back its operations
and relocate its headquarters to the small coastal town of Pare-Pare.
Nevertheless, Laskar Jundullah has maintained political support at
district-level in some parts of South Sulawesi such as Bulukumba, and continues
to operate in these districts.
Explaining immunity
FPI is also active outside Laskar Jundullah strongholds. In December 2010, FPI
members disbursed a transgender beauty pageant in Makassar, proclaiming the
event in violation of Shari’a. The group has also repeatedly raided parks to
search for prostitutes, and has targeted street vendors and kiosks selling
alcohol. As in many other provinces in Indonesia, FPI has also repeatedly
attacked the local Ahmadiyah congregation, and demanded that the provincial
government ban the group.
The attacks on Ahmadiyah spurred calls to ban FPI in South Sulawesi by local
human rights groups and secular NGOs, along with research institutes and youth
organisations affiliated with the mainstream Islamic groups. The provincial
government has resisted these calls, claiming that they do not have the legal
grounds to disband the group. In part, government inaction reflects FPI's elite
backing. But this inaction also shows that conservative Muslims have become a
significant political constituency in South Sulawesi, which political leaders
are reluctant to alienate by taking firm action against FPI.
One sign of rising religious conservatism in South Sulawesi over the past
decade is increasingly open displays of Islamic piety. It is no longer
considered old-fashioned to wear Islamic dress, join a prayer group or send
one's children to an Islamic school. Public piety is now in fact a sign of
social status, amid efforts to make religion fun and trendy. These social
changes are supported by Shari'a-inspired regional regulations, which promote
an explicitly religious lifestyle. The relationship between the two is mutually
reinforcing: the more popular such lifestyles become, the more incentive there
is for politicians to enact Shari'a-inspired regulations to win votes and raise
funds.
As conservatism has grown, Islamic politicians have also achieved new electoral
success. One clear example is the electoral fortunes of Kahar Muzakkar's three
sons. Aziz Kahar Muzakkar has twice won office as one of South Sulawesi's four
representatives on the national Regional Representative Council (DPD), although
he also unsuccessfully ran for governor in 2007. His brother Buhari Kahar
Muzakkar is a provincial parliamentarian for Islamic party PAN, while Andi
Muzakkar is the district head in Luwu. At the same time, other political
figures have started to return to KPPSI, seeking to gain popularity by pledging
their support for the implementation of Shari’a laws or calling for the release
of Laskar Jundullah head Agus Dwikarna.
As well as contributing to the impunity enjoyed by FPI, rising conservatism
also helps the organisation to gain young, well-educated members. People often
assume FPI's ranks are populated with thugs and criminals, but many members
have good jobs at top companies and government departments. Joining groups like
FPI can also be a way into politics for educated youths, when these
organisations have elite backing or unofficial associations with political
parties. FPI and its ilk are also attractive because they are visible advocates
of issues that concern Muslims, and sometimes take direct action. These issues
include support for Palestine, as well as domestic problems such as religious
conflicts and moral degradation.
More broadly, university campuses have long been home to radical groups.
Members of these student groups then joined mainstream radical organisations
such as Laskar Jihad, which sent volunteers to Ambon and Poso during the
violent conflicts there. Some students conducted sweepings to look for
non-Muslim students at the height of these conflicts, or have carried out other
violent acts, such as burning a Catholic church on Hasanuddin University campus
in 2009.
Support from mainstream groups
FPI's symbiotic relations with elites and the state's failure to curb religious
violence have each contributed to the organisation's rise. But the ambiguous
attitudes of mainstream Islamic groups have been another key factor. Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah both objected when calls to ban FPI peaked earlier
this year. One interpretation of this stance might be that these groups want to
maintain their progressive credentials by supporting secular and tolerant
movements, while also pleasing conservative and radical constituents. For
Nahdlatul Ulama in particular, this represented a significant shift. NU had
itself urged a ban after FPI wounded some of its members in their 2008 Monas
attack. In NU strongholds in Java such as Jember and Banyumas, pressure from NU
also forced FPI to dissolve its local chapters.
FPI has emerged as South Sulawesi's leading Islamic paramilitary group
Henky Widjaja
NU's change of heart suggests a new resonance of FPI's name as the ‘Islamic
Defenders' Front’ for other Islamic organisations. When NU and Muhammadiyah
objected to calls for a ban, each emphasised the role of FPI in 'embracing
virtue and rejecting vice' (amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar), contrasting it to the
slow response of state authorities to issues of concern to Muslims. A senior
member of NU's youth wing, Choirul Anam, urged the groups members not to lend
their voice to calls for a ban, saying people must look at the root cause of
FPI's actions – the lack of law enforcement in cases where social norms are
flouted – rather than to simply blame the group. Along similar lines, senior
Muhammadiyah figure Agus Trisundani observed that despite its shortcomings, FPI
was needed to maintain the spirit of amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar among Indonesian
Muslims.
Calls to ban FPI also spurred demands that the government ban secular and
liberal groups, including the prominent Liberal Islamic Network (JIL). Even
Hasyim Muzadi, a progressive figure and former NU chairperson, made comments of
this sort. While criticising FPI's violent acts, Muzadi deemed that efforts to
ban FPI would be ineffective, and said that if FPI were banned, the government
should also outlaw organisations that exploited issues such as humanity and
democracy to promote foreign interests in Indonesia.
Attack dog?
Last September, the anti-secrecy website Wikileaks published the leaked US
diplomatic cables reporting that FPI had been sponsored by the Indonesian
security forces to play the role of 'attack dog', making it possible for the
military to intimidate various targets without incurring the criticism that
direct action would have generated.
FPI might play the same role for other Islamic organisations. In South
Sulawesi, it is part of the Forum Umat Islam (FUI), which also counts among its
members Hizbut Tahrir, Nahdlatul Ulama, Wahda Islamiyah, PITI (The Association
of Chinese Indonesian Muslims), and KPPSI. It operates in tandem with other
groups in this forum in activities such as the protests against Ahmadiyah.
Mainstream groups, such as Muhammadiyah and NU, take no active part when FPI
acts violently in South Sulawesi though. But nor do they raise their voices in
condemnation. Their silence may well be a sign of approval, and reflect a
symbiotic relationship whereby vigilante groups like FPI exert pressure on
issues of mutual concern.
Viewed in this light, FPI and other similar groups in Indonesia are likely to
continue to operate for as long as there is demand for their services. It is
hard to imagine them disappearing any time soon given the growing conservatism
in society, the ongoing failure of the state to address the problem religious
violence and the ambiguous attitude of mainstream Islamic groups.
Henky Widjaja ([email protected]) is a PhD researcher in Anthropology
at Leiden University and currently stationed at the Van Vollenhoven Institute,
Leiden Law School, The Netherlands.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
