http://www.syria-today.com/index.php/focus/21331-slipping-into-hell-
Slipping into hell
November 2012
The contested heart of the Syrian conflict.
By Abdulhamid Qabbani
Photo Samara Sallam
Not until 16 months after the uprising began did the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) classify the violence in Syria as a
full-blown non-international conflict—in layman’s terms, a civil war. But
despite this declaration and a death toll now topping 23,000, many Syrians
still say their country-long unity is not yet broken by civil war. “I will
never take up a weapon against any Syrian; if I do, it will only be to defend
myself,” said Rami, 25, a Damascus-based activist.
On what grounds?
Analysts commonly define civil war as caused by a conflict of interests
between various groups within one country, whether these interests are
organised on economic, political, ethnic or religious grounds. This last
factor, some claim, is one main reason behind the Syrian conflict. However,
although the intensified fighting stirred sectarianism in some areas, many say
the uprising’s main trigger was desire for political reform.
Less than fortnight after the uprising started on March 15 last year with
protests in Dera’a demanding such reforms, Presidential Political and Media
Adviser Bouthaina Shabaan declared that what was taking place was nothing but
sectarian strife. Obviously, she said, the country was “the target of a project
to sow sectarian strife to compromise Syria and the unique co-existence model
distinguishing it,” official news agency SANA reported.
Although at that time protests were limited and there was little evidence
that belonging to any particular sect was driving dissent, a fierce public
campaign began following Shaaban’s speech, denouncing sectarianism and urging
support for the regime’s reform programme. “I am against sectarianism and my
sect is Syrian,” billboards in Damascus read, essentially boiling the uprising
down to sectarian incitement.
Early on, protestors contradicted this view, stressing their unity with
all Syrians by chanting: “One, one, one, the Syrian people are one.” As
violence escalated, however, the regime’s claims of religion-based conflict
gained some weight as rumours spread of sectarian slogans, such as “Alawites to
the tomb and Christians to Beirut,” being chanted in some restive areas,
particularly Homs. Opposition members, however, played them down as “regime
fabrications” intended to scare minorities into supporting the government.
A sectarian dynamic did develop, however, as some opposition groups were
galvanised by anti-Shi’a hatred preached by Saudi-based Syrian Sheikh Adnan
al-Arour whose daily talks on Al-Wesal, a Saudi-funded religious channel, made
him popular especially among radicals and some sections of the working class.
An amateur video posted on YouTube on June 25 last year shows the Sunni Sheikh
giving a televised speech threatening Alawites: “By Almighty God, we will mince
in meat-grinders and feed to dogs anyone from this sect who is proved to be
involved in fighting with the regime.”
Syria’s conscript-based army contains members of all the country’s sects,
though some analysts say its officers are drawn more heavily from minority
groups. However, shabbiha (pro-regime militias) believed to have committed the
bloodiest massacres, such as that of Homs’ Houla, a mainly Sunni town, where
according to media reports 108 people were killed, are often held to be largely
from one sect loyal to the regime. But this is not always true. Online footage
shot on July 31 purportedly shows Syrian rebels executing regime loyalists from
Aleppo’s powerful Berri clan, a Sunni family clearly targeted by non-sect-based
revenge.
Sectarian ideology has, however, translated into violence on the ground
in some places, including many suburbs of Hama and Homs where anti-government
militias have targeted Alawites.
But many Syrians, particularly residents of multi-sect Damascus, say the
chances of a sectarian-based civil war are slim. “We have always fasted with
Muslims,” said Lama, 36, a Christian resident of the Damascus suburb Jaramana,
adding that she cannot envisage this coexistence ending up in “Syrian
[civilians] killing one another” over religious differences.
Nevertheless, a member of the UN observer mission in Syria with
experience in Iraq and the Balkans told Syria Today on condition of anonymity
that “it will be a civil war in the end, between Sunni (more or less) against
all others (more or less). Right now it is not, as the parties are not clearly
defined.”
“Until now the conflict has been between the majority Sunni fighters and
the Alawites in formal and informal regime forces,” says Peter Harling of the
International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based lobby group. “The involvement of
other minority civilian militias could be disastrous.”
Contested foundations
Gilbert Achcar, a professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies
in London, told London-based daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi on August 24 that the
Syrian conflict was not a sectarian war but a civil, “political” one caused by
late president Hafez al-Assad’s restructuring of the Syrian armed forces “on
the basis of sectarianism.”
Hassan Abbas, a researcher at the French Institute of the Near East in
Damascus, agreed that “the regime is responsible for sectarianism,” adding that
the Syrian conflict is not sectarian, but rather a political, Spanish-style
civil war “between two parts [of the country] over the mechanism of ruling.”
Some observers believe the government’s failure to establish a
citizen-based society also contributed to sectarian tensions. Many cite the
government’s suppression of the “Damascus Spring” which flowered in the brief
easing of state political control following President Bashar al-Assad’s
accession to power in July 2000. Culminating in the “Damascus Declaration for
Democratic National Change”, signed in 2005 by many well- known figures of all
backgrounds and sects, which aimed at building a modern state based on
citizenship. The initiative was subsequently suppressed and some signatories,
such as Michel Kilo, were arrested.
“The regime could have consolidated citizenship but instead it
consolidated sectarianism,” said Bassam al-Kadi, director of the Syrian Women’s
Observatory, referring to the alliance the government formed with certain
Islamic figures, including prominent Sunni sheikhs, to win over the majority
Sunnis.
Fears of division
Some analysts, however, say Syria’s political future could be partly
determined by sectarian divisions. Others argue that the regime has already
abandoned its north-eastern province to its mainly Kurdish inhabitants, citing
the appearance of the forbidden Kurdish flag on some public buildings in
Qamishli and other areas. One resident of a Kurdish area north of Aleppo who
requested anonymity told Syria Today that unlike before the uprising began,
Kurdish militias are largely allowed to man their own checkpoints as long as no
violence results.
Fawaz Gerges, professor of Middle Eastern Politics at the London School
of Economics, argued that “the Syrian Kurds...are laying the foundation for an
autonomous region like their counterparts in Iraq,” the BBC news website
reported on August 10.
This has sparked fears that other Syrian provinces, including eastern
Deir ez-Zor and the coastal cities, could follow suit if the regime collapses.
Abdel Bari Atwan, editor-in-chief of London-based daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi,
warned on August 6 in the Turkish daily Star Gazete about the “current drive
for fragmentation” in Syria, especially given “a general climate of
sectarianism, mistrust and fear, [and] organizations and militias springing up
based on narrow, local agendas”.
Dagher, however, insisted that the context of the Syrian uprising--the
“Arab Spring” which entailed the ouster of many long-ruling Arab leaders—links
it inseparably to these revolutions. Therefore, he argued, while the conflict
might include “sectarian trespasses”, the popular peaceful uprising demanding
freedom remains its heart.
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