http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/thanks-pdi-p-jokowi-wins-despite-poor-campaign/

No Thanks to the PDI-P: Jokowi Wins Despite a Poor Campaign
By Yohanes Sulaiman on 08:19 pm Jul 13, 2014
Category Commentary, Opinion
Tags: 2014 Indonesia Presidential Election, PDI-P Indonesian Democratic Party 
of Struggle
  
Indonesian presidential candidate Joko "Jokowi" Widodo stands beside former 
Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnoputri and her daughter Puan Maharani. 
(Reuters Photo/Beawiharta)

Despite an ineffectual campaign by Indonesia’s Democratic Party of Struggle 
(PDI-P), Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo won Indonesia’s presidential election, 
according to quick count results.

Data from reputable survey centers such as SMRC (Saiful Mujani Research & 
Consulting) showed a 3 percent to 5 percent margin of victory for Jokowi, 
Widodo’s popular nickname.

This apparently comfortable margin, however, does not reflect how tight the 
race was. Former military general Prabowo Subianto almost snatched victory from 
the jaws of defeat in a race that Jokowi was supposed to win easily. Six months 
ago, surveys showed he had four times more popular support than Prabowo.

With intense campaigning, Prabowo managed to close the gap in opinion polls 
just before the election. Prabowo still has yet to concede defeat, relying on 
four (of 11) quick count results that show him leading. The General Election 
Commission (KPU) will announce the result on July 22.

Before April’s legislative election, Jokowi had a commanding lead in opinion 
polls of around 30 percent. But he started his campaign with a severe 
disadvantage. The PDI-P selected him as the party’s candidate only very late in 
the legislative campaign period.

The PDI-P did not prominently promote Jokowi in most of its campaign material. 
The party’s ads show either chairwoman and former Indonesian President Megawati 
Soekarnoputri or her daughter Puan Maharani. As a result Jokowi’s impact in the 
legislative election was minimal.

When votes for the legislative election were finally tallied, the PDI-P’s share 
of votes was far below the high (and often unrealistic) expectations. Many 
commentators and even people in his own party started to blame Jokowi. They 
questioned whether the “Jokowi Effect” actually exists.

Further compounding the problems, Jokowi had to wait until he received 
Megawati’s approval in mid-March before he could become the PDI-P’s 
presidential candidate. Much to his disadvantage, he could not respond to smear 
campaigns that began to swirl during the legislative election campaign. Worse, 
his waiting for Megawati’s approval provided his opponents with ammunition to 
cast doubt about his ability as a leader.

Prabowo did not have Jokowi’s problem of trying to become the standard-bearer 
of his party. But he had two main challenges: his poor human rights record and 
his lag in the polls.

Prabowo had to campaign aggressively. He built a huge coalition of several 
political parties. He expected the party machinery to turn out votes for him.

Prabowo also counted on his coalition partners to attack Jokowi with a barrage 
of negative campaigns to create doubt in voters’ minds. Backed by media moguls 
and his billionaire brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, Prabowo had an effective 
campaign team that spread his message all over the place.

The tactics worked, thanks to the ineffectual responses from Jokowi’s team. By 
the end of June, Prabowo was neck-and-neck with Jokowi in the polls.

Several factors helped Jokowi salvage his campaign. First, and most 
importantly, Jokowi managed to attract a number of dedicated volunteers who 
were willing to spend their own money and work tirelessly to spread his 
messages to voters.

The effect of those volunteers could hardly be overestimated. They organized a 
massive pro-Jokowi concert on the weekend before the election. The concert, 
which was held on the same day as the last presidential debate, managed to 
mobilize youth voters to support him.

The second factor was the presidential debates. While the debates did little to 
influence undecided voters, the main purpose of the debate for the campaigns 
was to mobilize and energize the debate winner’s supporters.

Here, Prabowo failed to use the debates to question Jokowi’s fitness as a 
leader and undermine the morale of Jokowi’s supporters. Instead, Prabowo 
appeared unprepared in the first debate. Meanwhile, Jokowi and his running 
mate, Jusuf Kalla, used the debates as a showcase of their program and can-do 
mentality.

Prabowo and his running mate, Hatta Rajasa, performed well in the second and 
fourth debates. However, Jokowi and Kalla handily won the final debate. That 
momentum continued to election day.

The third factor, which was beyond anyone’s control, was the fiasco of the 
polling in Hong Kong. Hundreds of Indonesia’s migrant workers were denied the 
right to vote after the polling station closed at 5 p.m. on Sunday. The General 
Election Commission (KPU) was accused of purposely preventing Jokowi’s 
supporters from casting their votes.

While the details are still sketchy and in dispute, this created an impression 
among Jokowi’s supporters that Prabowo had managed to turn the system and the 
election commission against them. This incident galvanized Jokowi’s supporters 
and increased their turnout in Wednesday’s election.

These three factors helped propel Jokowi’s recovery. He thus managed to stem 
his losses and prevail against Prabowo. It was a close call, though, and Jokowi 
won in spite of his party’s poor performance.

Yohanes Sulaiman is a lecturer in international relations and political science 
at the Indonesian Defense University.

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