Commit ad6c00283163 ("swiotlb: Free tbl memory in swiotlb_exit()")
introduced a set_memory_encrypted() call to swiotlb_exit() so that the
buffer pages are returned to an encrypted state prior to being freed.

Sachin reports that this leads to the following crash on a Power server:

[    0.010799] software IO TLB: tearing down default memory pool
[    0.010805] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    0.010808] kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:98!

Nick spotted that this is because set_memory_encrypted() is issuing an
ultracall which doesn't exist for the processor, and should therefore
be gated by mem_encrypt_active() to mirror the x86 implementation.

Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Claire Chang <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Robin Murphy <[email protected]>
Fixes: ad6c00283163 ("swiotlb: Free tbl memory in swiotlb_exit()")
Suggested-by: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sachin Sant <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sachin Sant <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
Link: 
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c 
b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c
index 1d829e257996..87f001b4c4e4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ void __init svm_swiotlb_init(void)
 
 int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 {
+       if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+               return 0;
+
        if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(addr))
                return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -73,6 +76,9 @@ int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 
 int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 {
+       if (!mem_encrypt_active())
+               return 0;
+
        if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(addr))
                return -EINVAL;
 
-- 
2.32.0.554.ge1b32706d8-goog

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