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- -------- Original Message -------- Subject: [Dewayne-Net] Edward Luttwak: In a Single Night (Pre-emptive take-out of Iran's nuclear capability) Date: Thu, 09 Feb 2006 11:27:50 -0800 From: Dewayne Hendricks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Dewayne-Net Technology List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> References: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [Note: This item comes from friend John McMullen. DLH] > From: "John F. McMullen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Date: February 8, 2006 12:46:07 PM PST > To: "johnmac's living room" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Cc: USA Talk List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Dewayne Hendricks > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Commonweal Mailing List > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Edward Luttwak: In a Single Night (Pre-emptive take-out of > Iran's nuclear capability) > > (johnmac -- Do I hear the war drums beginning to beat?) > > From the Wall Street Journal -- <http://online.wsj.com/article/ > SB113937026599968085.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries> > > COMMENTARY > In a Single Night > By EDWARD N. LUTTWAK > > Many commentators argue that a pre-emptive air attack against > Iran's nuclear installations is unfeasible. It would not be swift > or surgical, they say, because it would require thousands of strike > and defense-suppression sorties. And it is likely to fail even then > because some facilities might be too well hidden or too strongly > protected. There may well be other, perfectly valid reasons to > oppose an attack on Iran's nuclear sites. But let's not pretend > that such an attack has no chance of success. In fact, the odds are > rather good. > > The skeptics begin sensibly enough by rejecting any direct > comparison with Israel's 1981 air attack that incapacitated the > Osirak reactor, stopping Saddam Hussein's first try at producing > plutonium bombs. Iran is evidently following a different and much > larger-scale path to nuclear weapons, by the centrifuge > "enrichment" of uranium hexafluoride gas to increase the proportion > of fissile uranium 235. It requires a number of different plants > operating in series to go from natural uranium to highly enriched > uranium formed in the specific shapes needed to obtain an explosive > chain reaction. Some of these plants, notably the Natanz centrifuge > plant, are both very large and built below ground with thick > overhead protection. > > It is at this point that the argument breaks down. Yes, Iraq's > weapon program of 1981 was stopped by a single air strike carried > out by less than a squadron of fighter-bombers because it was > centered in a single large reactor building. Once it was destroyed, > the mission was accomplished. To do the same to Iran's 100-odd > facilities would require almost a hundred times as many sorties as > the Israelis flew in 1981, which would strain even the U.S. Air > Force. Some would even add many more sorties to carry out a > preliminary suppression campaign against Iran's air defenses (a > collection of inoperable anti-aircraft weapons and obsolete > fighters with outdated missiles). But the claim that to stop Iran's > program all of its nuclear sites must be destroyed is simply wrong. > > An air attack is not a Las Vegas demolitions contract, where > nothing must be left but well-flattened ground for the new casino > to be built. Iran might need 100 buildings in good working order to > make its bomb, but it is enough to demolish a few critical > installations to delay its program for years -- and perhaps longer > because it would become harder or impossible for Iran to buy the > materials it bought when its efforts were still secret. Some of > these installations may be thickly protected against air attack, > but it seems that their architecture has not kept up with the > performance of the latest penetration bombs. > > Nor could destroyed items be easily replaced by domestic > production. In spite of all the claims of technological self- > sufficiency by its engineer-president, not even metal parts of any > complexity can be successfully machined in Iran. More than 35% of > Iran's gasoline must now be imported because the capacity of its > foreign-built refineries cannot be expanded without components > currently under U.S. embargo, and which the locals cannot copy. > Aircraft regularly fall out of the sky because Iranians are unable > to reverse-engineer spare parts. > > The bombing of Iran's nuclear installations may still be a bad idea > for other reasons, but not because it would require a huge air > offensive. On the contrary, it could all be done in a single night. > One may hope that Iran's rulers will therefore accept a diplomatic > solution rather than gamble all on wildly exaggerated calculations. > > Mr. Luttwak is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic & > International Studies. Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFD7e9LtcdvoAezhUsRAvYIAKCDMXimAb03WvLyhZ0eK4u9/jABKACePZ/3 EAB7UjxVwoPwH+q0ltZJZ40= =ob++ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as [email protected] To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/
