Hi Christian,
I hope you not referring to the AAAv6 ideas? Because that is  just a way to
do access control and possibly combine it with the packet filters that in
most cases already sit in the router. It tells nothing about mandating it
everywhere - this is of course up to the service provider/enterprise to use,
but in the mobile systems there is a demand for AAA and this AAA draft could
be a good start. And it does not break multihoming, mobility!

Of course you can still use end-to end IPsec if you want that and at the
same time enforce authentication and authorazation towards the AAA server
and if the authentication suceeds, and then the router could update the
packet filter with the "authenticated" host's IP address (which could be the
CoA).

-- thomas

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Christian Huitema [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: den 20 april 2001 01:11
> To: Edward Vielmetti; Glenn Morrow
> Cc: Michael Thomas; Thomas Eklund; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: RE: Source addresses, DDoS prevention and ingress filtering
> 
> 
> I am not sure it is such a good idea.
> 
> From a security stand point, it is very weak. You are 
> trusting that some
> third party, at the other end of the network, will do the right thing.
> What happens if the "first hop" is compromised? And, by the way, what
> exactly is the first hop? The wireless LAN in my home? The Ethernet
> backbone in the same home? If you want any form of security, 
> you really
> have to build it yourself, e.g. by using IPSEC. The only form 
> of source
> address control that has a prayer of working is local, i.e. refuse to
> accept inbound packets in your domain that pretend to already 
> come from
> an inside address.
> 
> It is also very weak from a routing stand point. Internet routing is
> anything but symmetric. The exit path from a domain depends 
> only on the
> destination address, not the source address; insisting on 
> strict control
> of the source address basically breaks multi-homing. It also breaks
> several forms of mobility...
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Edward Vielmetti [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2001 10:41 AM
> > To: Glenn Morrow
> > Cc: Michael Thomas; Thomas Eklund; 
> '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'; 'ietf-
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED]'
> > Subject: RE: Source addresses, DDoS prevention and ingress filtering
> > 
> > And you're going to mandate source filtering on the first hop across
> the
> > entire internet, how?  It's a great idea and a best common practice
> but
> > not something that can be set by fiat.
> > 
> > Ed
> > 
> > On Wed, 18 Apr 2001, Glenn Morrow wrote:
> > 
> > > Then again if source filtering is mandated on the first hop this
> might
> > > eliminate the need to do filtering on other hops and this would
> > eliminate
> > > the need to do subnet translation or tunneling by either the MN or
> the
> > MR.
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Morrow, Glenn [RICH2:C330:EXCH]
> > > Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2001 11:56 AM
> > > To: 'Michael Thomas'
> > > Cc: Michael Thomas; Thomas Eklund; '[EMAIL PROTECTED]';
> > > '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
> > > Subject: RE: Source addresses, DDoS prevention and 
> ingress filtering
> > >
> > >
> > > Oh, I see what you were concerned about. It seems to me that an MR
> will
> > have
> > > to tunnel or subnet translate unless it is on it's home subnet.
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Michael Thomas [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > > Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2001 9:49 AM
> > > To: Morrow, Glenn [RICH2:C330:EXCH]
> > > Cc: Michael Thomas; Thomas Eklund; '[EMAIL PROTECTED]';
> > > '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
> > > Subject: RE: Source addresses, DDoS prevention and 
> ingress filtering
> > >
> > >
> > > Glenn Morrow writes:
> > >  > If the node behind the MR obtained its home address 
> from the  the
> > mobile
> > >  > router's subnet, then the MN will use this as the 
> source i.e. the
> > MN's
> > > home
> > >  > subnet is the MR's subnet.
> > >
> > >    Right, but when the MR's upstream router does an
> > >    RPF check... it will drop the SN's packets.
> > >
> > >  > Either way (tunneling or subnet translation), the topological
> > correctness
> > > is
> > >  > still maintained.
> > >
> > >    Well, that's sort of the problem. The SN doesn't
> > >    know that it's putting topologically incorrect
> > >    source address in the IP header.
> > >
> > >             Mike
> > >
> > 
> > 
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