Greetings. We have just submitted version -03 of the draft. This closes issues, #198, #199, #200, and #201.
Which leaves us with just one issue: #202 ========= Issue #202: Token makers generating the same tokens without synchronized DB Section 10.4 of the draft has a use-case where a cluster of gateways share the same QCD token secret, because they back each other up. The twist in this case, is that they don't have synchronized databases, so a fail-over is very much like a reboot - the IKE SA is gone, and QCD is effective in getting the other side to restart IKE quickly. The problem is, that without a failover, it may be possible to get a member that does not own the IKE SA to send the QCD token to an attacker. The attacker can then use this QCD token to tear down the IKE SA. The method in section 5.2 tries to address this, by considering the IP address of the token taker in the calculation. Tero claims that this is a scenario that we should not address, and that predicting or prescribing load balancer behavior in inherently dangerous. ======================= Please send your opinions to the list. This one actually addresses the scope of the document, so it's strange that this comes up as the last issue, but we still have to decide on this. Yoav _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
