Hi,
Anyways, if there is already more implementations doing IKE
framentation, it might be good idea to think whether we should
standardize that. On the other hand I am not sure if they are well
enough documented so that different implementations actually talk each
other...
We support IKEv1 fragmentation based on documentation found at
msdn.microsoft.com.
We are able to interoperate with both Microsoft and Cisco.
Anyways we should most likely act fastly if we want to get this fixed
for IKEv2.
As for IKEv2, I don't know how Cisco is doing fragmentation in this case
(it seems to have support for it), but if it is done similarly to IKEv1,
than I prefer our own solution - draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation.
The main difference is that in Microsoft/Cisco solution (for IKEv1)
the whole encrypted ISAKMP message is fragmented,
leaving each fragment unauthanticated untill message get reassembled
and its authentity could be verivied. This opens door for
a very simple DoS attack on receiver.
In our proposal each fragment is encrypted and authenticated
individually, that allows receiver to distinguish valid fragments
from bogus, thus preventing from abovementioned DoS attack.
And, of course, we have implemented this solution in our products.
And, of course, we are intersted in doing IKEv2 fragmentation
in standard, interoperable way (based either on our proposal or
smth else).
Regards,
Valery Smyslov.
--
kivi...@iki.fi
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