Hi Tero,
Thank you for the comment.
In fact, I agree that is not so easy. Actually [ARORA] addressed these kind
of scenarios on his draft already. For example, one of the usage scenarios
described is: the IKEv2 signaling and the IPsec tunnel mode traffic on
different addresses for load balancing purposes.

So, would you think it is a good idea to add this information to the draft
(I mean the new requirements when IKE_SAs and IPsec_SAs are on separated
nodes)? ... Or instead, would you think it would be good to ignore how
applications are managing their IPsec_SAs and IKE_SAs and  just delete the
sentence " Note that IKEv2 and IPsec session do not need to be on the same
node as IKEv2 and IPsec context are different".

We could also just mention that we wish to make clear that there are
parameters related to the IKE_SA and others for the IPsec_SA.

KR
Daniel Palomares



2014-03-06 0:07 GMT+01:00 Tero Kivinen <[email protected]>:

> In section 2 it says:
>
>    Note that IKEv2 and IPsec session do not need to be on the same node
>    as IKEv2 and IPsec context are different.
>
> This is not so easy. The RFC5996 says:
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 2.4.  State Synchronization and Connection Timeouts
> ...
>         An implementation needs to stop sending over any SA if
>    some failure prevents it from receiving on all of the associated SAs.
>    If a system creates Child SAs that can fail independently from one
>    another without the associated IKE SA being able to send a delete
>    message, then the system MUST negotiate such Child SAs using separate
>    IKE SAs.
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> I.e. if any of the IPsec SAs fail, then all of IPsec SAs created using
> same IKE SA, and the IKE SA must also fail. If IPsec SAs and IKE SA
> are on separate nodes, that do set up new kind of requirements for
> those nodes. I.e. if one node having IPsec SAs fails, the node having
> IKE SA needs to detect this, and send delete notification for each
> IPsec SA that were in that node. Also if the node having the IKE SA
> will fail, then all the IPsec SAs associated with that IKE SA, must
> stop sending, i.e. they needs to be destroyed.
> --
> [email protected]
>
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