Hi Yaron and Yoav, An updated draft addressing your comments has been posted.
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-pauly-ipsecme-tcp-encaps-02.txt Please check it out, and provide feedback. Thanks. Samy. From: Yaron Sheffer <[email protected]> Sent: Nov 20, 2015 3:11 PM To: Tommy Pauly; IPsecME WG Subject: Re: [IPsec] New revision of TCP Encapsulation draft Hi Tommy, I also think this is very relevant work. Here are some comments to -01: I think that Yoav's draft, draft-nir-ipsecme-ike-tcp-01, should be cited under "prior work", both because it is documented and also because I believe it is implemented by a vendor. In Sec. 1, under the UDP encapsulation, I suggest to add "Often peers will use UDP encapsulation even when there is no NAT on the path, for example because networks or middleboxes do not support IP protocols other than TCP and UDP." "Although a stream" - this paragraph is not worded very well (streams don't send anything) and is hard to understand. There are lots of networks that use jumbo frames and so hardcoding the value 1500 into the spec may not be a good idea. I can think of HA cases where several gateways are handling ESP SAs that are all associated with the same IKE SA. So I'm wondering why we are insisting on all Child SAs being in the same connection, and as a result requiring that an IKE message be the preamble to any new connection. Although it might seem obvious, I think Sec. 3 should say explicitly that if the connection is closed midway through a message, the recipient must silently drop the partial message. You may want to add to the last paragraph of the Security Considerations: This document explicitly does not define a profile for TLS when used in this manner, or any relation between identities at the IPsec level and those at the TLS level ("channel binding"). Thanks, Yaron On 11/20/2015 11:49 PM, Tommy Pauly wrote: > Hello, > > Based on the feedback received at our informal meeting in Yokohama, I’ve > updated the draft for TCP Encapsulation of IKEv2 and ESP: > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pauly-ipsecme-tcp-encaps-01 > > The revisions include: > - More explanation in the introduction about the motivation, and other work > that this draft is trying to standardize (3GPP recommendations, proprietary > IKEv1 IPSec over TCP versions, and SSL VPNs). > - Comments about maximum IKE and ESP message size within the TCP stream, > which is effective the MTU of the tunnel. > - Specify that if the TCP connection is brought down and re-established, the > first message on the stream must be an IKE message. > - Detailed considerations about interactions with middleboxes (thanks Graham > Bartlett for input on this). > > In the meeting in Yokohama, there was general agreement that this was > relevant work that we’d like to keep looking into. Please read the document, > and provide any feedback you have! > > Thanks, > Tommy > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
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