On 27/09/16 20:07, Valery Smyslov wrote: > > The attacker can however gain some benefits if he/she waits some time > until the half-open SA is expired on Responder and chooses the same SPI > and nonce for the next connection request. He/she will receive the same > puzzle > if the Responder doesn't change value of secret yet. Note that RFC7296 > recommends > changing secret frequently if under attack (RFC7296, Section 2.6): > > The responder should change the value of <secret> frequently, especially > if under attack. > > I think we can add some words to the draft that will recommend > to generate cookie in such a manner, that the cookie is not repeated > even if the same IP, SPI and nonce are used by Initiator.
Good one. Yeah I think it'd be fine to add that. All the rest of your and Yoav's responses are good too. Thanks, S.
smime.p7s
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