Several recent standards, including NIST SP 800- 56A and RFC
        5114, advocate the use of “DSA” parameters for Diffie-Hellman
        key exchange. While it is possible to use such parameters
        securely, additional validation checks are necessary to
        prevent well-known and potentially devastating attacks. In this
        paper, we observe that many Diffie-Hellman implementations do
        not properly validate key exchange inputs. Combined with other
        protocol properties and implementation choices, this can radically
        decrease security. We measure the prevalence of these parameter
        choices in the wild for HTTPS, POP3S, SMTP with STARTTLS,
        SSH, IKEv1, and IKEv2, finding millions of hosts using
        DSA and other non-“safe” primes for Diffie-Hellman
        key exchange, many of them in combination with potentially
        vulnerable behaviors. We examine over 20 open-source cryptographic
        libraries and applications and observe that until January 2016,
        not a single one validated subgroup orders by default.

This paper also actually understood the difficulties of IKE scanning!
And kudos to the authors for looking into so much deployment and open
source software!


IPsec mailing list

Reply via email to