Hey Valery, Thanks for the clarification, we'll add this statement in the draft!
Just because I'm interested: For me, this seems to be a general problem for implementing counter ciphers in multicast scenarios, regardless of implicit-iv or not. Do you know how the IV is usually chosen in multicast-implementations? Maybe we could add a recommendation in the draft. Thanks Tobias -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: IPsec [mailto:[email protected]] Im Auftrag von Valery Smyslov Gesendet: Montag, 10. Oktober 2016 09:06 An: Daniel Migault <[email protected]>; IPsecME WG <[email protected]> Betreff: Re: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification fordraft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv-01.txt Hi Daniel, I think you should add a text in the Security Considerations that these transforms MUST NOT be used in situations where there is a chance that Sequence Numbers repeat. The most prominent example where it can happen - multicast ESP SA with multiple senders. Regards, Valery. > Hi, > > Based on the feed backs and the discussions from the previous IETF, > see the updated version of our draft. We believe the document is in good shape to become a WG document. > > Feel free to support the draft and as usually, comments are welcome! > > BR, > Daniel > > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Saturday, October 08, 2016 7:15 PM > To: Tobias Guggemos <[email protected]>; Yoav Nir > <[email protected]>; Daniel Migault <[email protected]> > Subject: New Version Notification for > draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv-01.txt > > > A new version of I-D, draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv-01.txt > has been successfully submitted by Daniel Migault and posted to the IETF repository. > > Name: draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv > Revision: 01 > Title: Implicit IV for Counter-based Ciphers in IPsec Document date: > 2016-10-08 > Group: Individual Submission > Pages: 6 > URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv-01.txt > Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv/ > Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv-01 > Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv-01 > > Abstract: > IPsec ESP sends an initialization vector (IV) or nonce in each > packet, adding 8 or 16 octets. Some algorithms such as AES-GCM, AES- > CCM, AES-CTR and ChaCha20-Poly1305 require a unique nonce but do not > require an unpredictable nonce. When using such algorithms the > packet counter value can be used to generate a nonce, saving 8 octets > per packet. This document describes how to do this. > > > > > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of > submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. > > The IETF Secretariat > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
