Hello all,

I've updated the TCP Encapsulation draft with new recommendations around 
handling the mapping between IKE SAs and TCP Connections based on the 
conversation at the Seoul meeting. The relevant new text in section 6 is:

 
An initiator SHOULD only open one TCP connection per IKE SA, over
   which it sends all of the corresponding IKE and ESP messages.  This
   helps ensure that any firewall or NAT mappings allocated for the TCP
   connection apply to all of the traffic associated with the IKE SA
   equally.

   A responder SHOULD at any given time send packets for an IKE SA and
   its Child SAs over only one TCP connection.  It should choose the TCP
   connection on which it last received a valid and decryptable IKE or
   ESP message.  Since a connection may be broken and a new connection
   re-established by the initiator without the responder being aware, a
   responder SHOULD accept receiving IKE and ESP messages on a new
   connection.  It will then use that connection for all subsequent
   responses.  A responder MAY close a TCP connection that it perceives
   as idle and extraneous (one previously used for IKE and ESP messages
   that has been replaced by a new connection).

   Multiple IKE SAs SHOULD NOT share a single TCP connection.

Please respond to indicate your thoughts on this!

Thanks,
Tommy


> On Dec 4, 2016, at 3:04 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> 
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions of 
> the IETF.
> 
>        Title           : TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets
>        Authors         : Tommy Pauly
>                          Samy Touati
>                          Ravi Mantha
>       Filename        : draft-ietf-ipsecme-tcp-encaps-04.txt
>       Pages           : 21
>       Date            : 2016-12-04
> 
> Abstract:
>   This document describes a method to transport IKE and IPsec packets
>   over a TCP connection for traversing network middleboxes that may
>   block IKE negotiation over UDP.  This method, referred to as TCP
>   encapsulation, involves sending both IKE packets for tunnel
>   establishment as well as tunneled packets using ESP over a TCP
>   connection.  This method is intended to be used as a fallback option
>   when IKE cannot be negotiated over UDP.
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-tcp-encaps/
> 
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-tcp-encaps-04
> 
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-tcp-encaps-04
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
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