Hi Tero, > > CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange and rekey the IKE SA using PPK. But > > CREATE_CHILD_SA doesn’t allow to exchange identities. So, if > > pseudonyms were used in IKE_AUTH, how are you going to exchange real > > identities? > > Real IDs are never exchanged over wire. The server sees pseudonym
Then what is the content of IDi and IDr in IKE_AUTH in this case? > ID_KEY_ID \x1c747c060d209a223d1f9f51b0351b54, it looks it up from its > table and finds a mapping from there to [email protected]. From then on > it uses [email protected] as authenticated identifier, and verifies that > the raw public key, or shared key used to authenticate the user > actually matches the one configured to the [email protected]. > > Using certificates in this case would leak out the identity anyways, > so they cannot be used, or at least transmitted over wire. Even if > using raw public keys, the actual public keys must not be sent over > wire, it needs to be taken from the configuration. > > > And the peers must also somehow prove their real identities, so AUTH > > payloads must also be included, and we end up with something like > > full IKE_AUTH exchange... > > This all is done in the server, i.e. instead of using the ID sent over > the wire, the server uses the ID sent over wire as handle to the > table, and fetches the real ID to be used for policy decisions and > authentication from the that table. Again, what role the usual authentication (in IKE_AUTH) and usual IKE Identities play in this scenario? Regards, Valery. _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
