Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> wrote: > IKE_SA_INIT privacy concerns - David Schinazi > https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/slides-101-ipsecme-privacy-additions-to-the-ikev2-ike-sa-init-exchange-00
> Concerns around privacy of the peers (who the initiator is, and if the
> responder is running IKE)
I think that we had some consensus that we should split the document into two
problem statements. Protecting the initiator identity against MITM attackers
can be solved a whole bunch of ways. A zero-knowledge proof would seem to
be a better way to start to me.
The problem of making the IKE responders stealthed seems like a different
problem entirely.
> Proposal is to add a shared secret and a PRF. These are added as an
....
> Michael Richardson: Smells like IKEv1 PSK with XAUTH. Unhappy about
> that. Seems that you're able to provision PSKs to the clients. I would
> prefer to provision a raw public key than a PSK.
> In the case of a TLS connection, you already have a public key the
> server can sign with. I don't want more PSKs, let's do public key
> instead.
I just want to repeat this.
--
Michael Richardson <[email protected]>, Sandelman Software Works
-= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
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