On Thu, Oct 17, 2019 at 10:37:10PM -0400, Daniel Migault wrote: > Hi Benjamin, > Thanks you for the comments. Please see in line my responses. > Yours, > Daniel > On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 11:30 PM Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for > draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-08: No Objection > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > introductory paragraph, however.) > > Please refer to > https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv/ > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > COMMENT: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks for addressing my Discuss! > > A few new comments on the -08: > > Abstract > > If we're going to differentiate between nonce and IV, I think that > the algorithms require a unique but not necessarily unpredictable > *nonce*, > rather than *IV*. > > I would preferred to have IV instead of nonce is that IPsec provides > constraints on the IV, not the nonce. I expected to have switched from > algorithms to their implementations by writing "when used with IPsec" in > the previous sentence. In order to flip-flop from algorithm to their > implementations with IPsec, I propose to clarify this as follows: > OLD: > These > algorithms require a unique IV but do not require an unpredictable IV. > NEW: > This IV must be unique but can be predictable.
Thanks! > > Section 2 > > nit: s/Initialize/Initialization/ > > Fixed > > nit: s/similar mechanism/similar mechanisms/ plural > > Fixed > > > Section 7 > > My previous ballot was trying to note that the sender/receiver counters > MUST be reset (as noted here) even without this document, as part of > the core ESP requirements. So we don't need to use the "MUST" here as > if it's a new requirement; we can just say that this behavior is already > present due to the preexisting requirements > > Well, the reason I included it was that - at least my reading of ESP - ESP > seems to require key to be rekeyed when the SN reaches its limit only when > anti-replay is activated. In our case, we need to have this property even > without anti replay protection. Here is the text I considered rfc4303 > section 2.2 > """ > > The sender's counter and the receiver's counter are initialized to 0 > when an SA is established. (The first packet sent using a given SA > will have a sequence number of 1; see Section 3.3.3 for more details > on how the sequence number is generated.) If anti-replay is enabled > (the default), the transmitted sequence number must never be allowed > to cycle. Thus, the sender's counter and the receiver's counter MUST > be reset (by establishing a new SA and thus a new key) prior to the > transmission of the 2^32nd packet on an SA. > > """ Ah, it seems I was reading too quickly and missed the precondition. Thanks for the attention to detail! -Ben _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
