I am now preparing the shepherd writeup for draft-ietf-lwig-minimal-esp. I wanted to clarify and double check a few things:
- If the SPI is not random and is chosen by some application specific method -> it can reveal the application using ESP. - I assume a resource-constrained device would not have many inbound connections. Would it make sense to generate a byte of randomness instead of entire 32-bit SPI? At least some APIs allow asking for a byte of randomness (randomByte()). This is assuming an upper limit on the number of inbound connections. - When sequence numbers are time -> won't it reveal the time at which the packet was sent. - Are we comfortable with the recommendation: 'A node MAY drop anti-replay protection provided by IPsec, and instead implement its own internal mechanism.'? What might this internal mechanism look like? A few typos: ----- Section 3: Please expand SAD on first usage. Section 4: Typo: In a constrainted environment -> In a constrained environment I looked at old RFCs and they seem to use both crypto-suite and cryptosuite. I have a preference for the later. Perhaps we can remove the hyphen. ----- --Mohit _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
