Hi Éric, 

Please see inline. 

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Eric Vyncke (evyncke) <[email protected]>
> Envoyé : jeudi 27 avril 2023 09:03
> À : Valery Smyslov <[email protected]>; 'The IESG' <[email protected]>
> Cc : [email protected]; [email protected];
> [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
> Objet : Re: Éric Vyncke's Yes on draft-ietf-ipsecme-add-ike-11:
> (with COMMENT)
> 
> Hello Valery
> 
> Thanks for your prompt reply. Please look below for EV>
> 
> Regards
> 
> -éric
> 
> On 27/04/2023, 08:53, "Valery Smyslov" <[email protected]
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> 
> 
> Hi Éric,
> 
> 
> thank you for your comments. Please see inline (I will only
> address some of your comments).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------
> ------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------
> ------
> >
> > Thank you for the work put into this document. It really helps
> to
> > achieve the goals of the ADD WG :-) (only regret is that the
> IPSECME
> > WGLC was not formally extended to the ADD WG, a little more of
> > cross-WG collaboration is always welcome even if authors are
> also very active in ADD).
> >
> > Please find below some non-blocking COMMENT points (but replies
> would
> > be appreciated even if only for my own education), and one nit.
> >
> > Special thanks to Tero Kivinen for the shepherd's detailed
> write-up
> > including the WG consensus and the justification of the intended
> status.
> >
> > Other thanks to Patrick Mevzek, the DNS directorate reviewer,
> please
> > consider this dns-dir review:
> >
> > mevzek-2023-03-16/
> > (and the authors/chairs have also replied)
> >
> > I hope that this review helps to improve the document,
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > -éric
> >
> > # COMMENTS (non-blocking)
> >
> > I second Paul Wouters' DISCUSS point #2 and Zahed's one (even if
> this
> > may be the IPSECME WG usual process, it is not the IETF
> process).
> 
> 
> Are there any formal guidelines that list criteria for marking a
> document "Update" for another document?
> 
> EV> Alas no... some IESG have tried to get a formal definition and
> always failed ☹ ... I.e., common sense should apply in the
> absence of rules.
> 
> What I like about ipsecme position on that - there is a well
> understood criteria:
> if new specification requires that legacy implementations be
> updated, then the new specification "Updates" an old one. If this
> is not the case - no need to mark it as "Update".
> 
> 
> In our case, no change to implementations that are unaware of this
> document
> and only implement RFC 8598 is needed, so this is not (in our
> opinion) an "Update".
> 
> EV> this sounds logical

[Med] Thanks. 

> 
> > ## Section 1
> >
> > In the discussion about private CA / address for the DNS
> resolver, one more
> > sentence stating the obvious (when using a private CA then the
> client may use
> > the digest info payload) would be welcome. Alternatively, moving
> this
> > paragraph
> > before the reference to the appendix will make it clearer the
> link with
> > ENCDNS_DIGEST_INFO.
> >

[Med] Moved the text as suggested. 

> > ## Section 2
> >
> > Should RFC 8499 be normative (note RFC 7296 is normative and
> used in the
> > same
> > way)?
> >

[Med] I prefer to be consist with how we classified RFC8499 in other ADD 
document. 7296 is cited as a normative as this is the base IKE spec.

> > ## Section 3.2
> >
> > What is the responder behaviour when receiving a CFG_REQUEST
> with "ADN
> > Length"
> > different from 0 ? Symmetrical case for the initiator when "Num
> Hash Algs" is
> > not 1 in a CFG_SET. If the generic behaviour described in
> section 4 (`As a
> > reminder, badly formatted attributes or unacceptable fields are
> handled as per
> > Section 2.21 of [RFC7296].`), then why other fields (notably
> "R") have specific
> > text ? The reminder of section 4 should rather be in section 3
> (but this is a
> > matter of taste).
> 
> 
> "R" is a RESERVED field and is treated as any other RESERVED field
> in IKEv2 -
> its value (whether it is 0 or not) is ignored. We cannot ignore
> invalid
> values in other fields, because the receiver in this case has no
> clue what
> the sender meant.
> 
> 
> > `Note that SHA2-256 is mandatory to implement` does this mean
> that SHA2-
> > 256
> > identifier *MUST* always be in the list or is it implicit and
> does not have to
> > be in the list ?
> 
> 
> I believe not. It is mandatory to implement in general, for
> operations on the Internet.
> Mutually consenting parties operating in closed environment may
> very well ignore this MTI requirement
> and list only other values.
> 
> EV> ah ah, SHA2 is mandatory to implement but may not be used.
> This subtlety had escaped me, should the text be clear about this
> ?
> 

[Med] Made this change: 

OLD; 
Specifies a list of 16-bit hash algorithm identifiers that are supported by the 
encrypted DNS client. 

NEW:
Specifies a list of 16-bit hash algorithm identifiers that are supported by the 
encrypted DNS client. This list may be controlled by a local policy.

Please let us know if you prefer a more specific wording. Thanks. 

> Regards,
> Valery.
> 
> 
> > # NITS (non-blocking / cosmetic)
> >
> > ## Appendix A.1
> >
> > No need to expand VPN as it is both well-known and used before
> without
> > expansion ;)
> >
> >
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 


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