Hi Daniel,

Thanks for your clarification, I think I may have better understanding of your 
problem statement. I try to give an example below, please correct me if I’m 
wrong.

First, let’s assume the encryption/decryption capability of ingress node is 
15000 bytes and the capability of egress node is 5000 bytes. And, in one case, 
the original (inner) packet which needs to be encrypted by the ingress node is 
9000 bytes.
The ingress node encrypts this packet and adds the IPsec encapsulation, and 
this IPsec-processed packet is also larger than the Link MTU. The ingress node 
fragments this IPsec-processed packet and sends all the fragments to the egress 
node.
The egress node reassembles the packet and realizes the encrypted packet 
exceeds its decryption capability, so it will drop the packet and notify the 
ingress node.

I don’t know whether this case is a real problem. And, I also don’t know 
whether the ICMP PTB can solve the problem. If not, then I agree the IKE PTB 
defined by this draft is a way to forward.


Besides that, I found many acronyms are used in this draft. I think simplifying 
them may be better for understanding.
For example, LMTU (Link MTU) and LMAP (Link Maximum Atomic Packet) are both 
used, but I feel they are the same thing.
TLP (Tunnel Link Packet) and LTP (no definition) are both used, and I think LTP 
is misspelled. In some cases, “IPsec encapsulated TTP” is used, and I think it 
also means TLP.

Regards & Thanks!
Wei Pan (潘伟)

From: IPsec [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Daniel Migault
Sent: Wednesday, August 2, 2023 12:56 AM
To: Ben Schwartz <[email protected]>
Cc: Harold Liu <[email protected]>; [email protected]
Subject: Re: [IPsec] -ikev2-mtu-dect: IKEv2 PTB Notification


Hi Ben,

Just trying to position our understanding of  the position between the ICMP PTB 
and the IKE PTB.

If an incoming Encrypted packet is larger than the Link MTU, an ICMP PTB is 
sent, otherwise the packet is accepted. If fragments are received, a reassembly 
operation happens and the packet may be too large to be built or decrypted. I 
am unaware of any ICMP signaling between the gateway that could carry this 
information. As far as I understand, ICMP PTB is not issued for a reassembled 
packet as long as each of the fragments are below the MTU. This is the reason 
we send the EMTU_R which designates the maximum size the egress gateway can 
handle.

EMTU_R could be a configuration parameter that would not change, but that value 
also considers the MTU of the router part which can be changed.

As soon as it passes the interface, as I understand it, an ICMP PTB will be 
sent to the Source and not the gateway. As I understand it, EMTU_R defines the 
maximum payload the Link network is able to handle. In our case, the payload is 
the encrypted ESP packet that may have been reassembled. The packet is passed 
to the decryption.  Once decrypted, the clear text packet is passed to the 
router of the node. The router may send an ICMP PTB, which will be sent to the 
Source or treat that packet. I see EMTU_R as reflecting the node of the router 
with Tunnel MTU = EMTU_R - ESP overhead

Considering a ping encapsulated in esp - we may discover the MTU as well as the 
EMTU_R by fragmenting unless we meet EMTU_R.

Note also that since we want to avoid fragmentation having a discovery 
mechanism that relies on fragmentation may not be the best idea.

Yours,

Daniel

On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 1:22 PM Daniel Migault 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
An encapsulated ICMP ECHO would get a response from the router (not the 
interface) of the security gateway. I have not read carefully 
draft-colitti-ipsecme-esp-ping but this is potentially what we could use to 
discover that path upon which we could set DF=1. That said, if MTU changes, we 
need to receive a notification.
I tend to think that extending  colitti-ipsecme-esp-ping to other ICMP plus 
defining PLMTU could replace our IKE PTB.


On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 12:57 PM Ben Schwartz 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
It seems to me that the statement "This packet is too big for me to decrypt" is 
quite different from "This packet arrived fragmented".  The former can 
generally be negotiated in the handshake, whereas the latter is a dynamic 
behavior of the underlying path.

Monitoring the Path MTU is important, even when the path traverses an ICMP 
blackhole.  So while I don't see the value of the PTB extension, I can 
understand the rationale for the LMAP extension.  However, I would like to see 
a bit more description of the whole system.  How do I send path probes to 
elicit these responses?  Can I use ICMP ECHO inside the tunnel, or do we need 
draft-colitti-ipsecme-esp-ping?  If we have path probes, why not just set DF=1 
on the outer header for PMTUD?

--Ben Schwartz
________________________________
From: Daniel Migault <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Sent: Monday, July 31, 2023 12:10 PM
To: Ben Schwartz <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Cc: Harold Liu 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>;
 [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] -ikev2-mtu-dect: IKEv2 PTB Notification

Hi Ben, Please see my comments. On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 10: 47 AM Ben Schwartz 
<bemasc@ meta. com> wrote: Hi Harold, It sounds like you're describing a 
different problem. Daniel mentioned a concern about cases in which "the 
encrypted
Hi Ben,
Please see my comments.
On Mon, Jul 31, 2023 at 10:47 AM Ben Schwartz 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hi Harold,

It sounds like you're describing a different problem.  Daniel mentioned a 
concern about cases in which "the encrypted packet is too big and so cannot be 
decrypted".
We see the MTU indicating the size the packet the egress interface is able to 
handle which includes the ability to reassemble and decrypt the packet. In that 
sense, I see sending the EMTU_R as very similar to an ICMP PTB except. I am 
wondering if you see any reasons for these issues to be considered differently 
and how you think such distinction could help.
That's quite different from an MTU limit on the forwarding path, which can be 
dealt with using ordinary IP fragmentation and PMTUD.
Fragmentation works, but costs too much resources and this draft is aiming at 
reducing such operations. Our concern is with IPv4, where DF=1 leads to a 
blackholing situation. PMTUD is extremely difficult as ICMP messages are not 
received by the ingress gateway. PLMTUD 
I-D.spiriyath-ipsecme-dynamic-ipsec-pmtu for ESP is another path, but it would 
take a lot of effort.

Yours,
Daniel

--Ben SchwartzI-D.spiriyath-ipsecme-dynamic-ipsec-pmtu
________________________________
From: Harold Liu 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Sent: Sunday, July 30, 2023 9:28 PM
To: Ben Schwartz <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Daniel Migault 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Cc: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Subject: RE: [IPsec] -ikev2-mtu-dect: IKEv2 PTB Notification

Ben, thanks for your comment. Yes at the beginning we thought what you thought, 
we consider the solution as “Negotiate it up front (in IKEv2)”, however the 
challenge here is the MTU of the router on the forwarding path can be changed 
at any

Ben, thanks for your comment.



Yes at the beginning we thought what you thought, we consider the solution as 
“Negotiate it up front (in IKEv2)”, however the challenge here is the MTU of 
the router on the forwarding path can be changed at any time (for example, the 
router changes the configuration for some reason, or changes the forwarding 
path for some reason).



If the MTU of any forwarding node on the forwarding path changes (even as to 
the whole forwarding path changes), a pre-negotiated MTU is probably not 
applicable. Therefore, we defined the solution is to discover MTU in-band via 
error responses.



Brs



From: IPsec <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> On Behalf 
Of Ben Schwartz
Sent: Saturday, July 29, 2023 8:01 AM
To: Daniel Migault <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Cc: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] -ikev2-mtu-dect: IKEv2 PTB Notification



+mailing list (oops)



I think I understand the difficulty here.  In IPv6, a "maximum reassembled ESP 
size" can be modeled as a next-hop MTU on the plaintext, but in IPv4 an 
enormous ESP could be decrypted and fragmented forward over a next hop with a 
reasonable MTU.



If this kind of ESP size limit is allowed, I think the best architecture would 
be to negotiate it up front (in IKEv2) since it is a static property of the 
endpoints, rather than discovering it in-band via error responses.



--Ben Schwartz

________________________________

From: Daniel Migault <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Sent: Friday, July 28, 2023 10:47 AM
To: Ben Schwartz <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] -ikev2-mtu-dect: IKEv2 PTB Notification



I see the next link as being the network behind the egress security gateway in 
which case the paquet would be the clear text packet. In that case maybe we 
could expect a ICMP PTB being sent to the source. The scenario we have is the 
packet

I see the next link as being the network behind the egress security gateway in 
which case the paquet would be the clear text packet. In that case maybe we 
could expect a ICMP PTB being sent to the source.

The scenario we have is the packet being so big that decryption cannot be 
performed - for example once reassembled. The egress security gateway has an 
ESP packet that it cannot process. The normal way would be to send an ICMP PTB 
but that ICMP PTB does not contain sufficient information for the egress to 
address the issue. The IKE message could be seen as duplicating the ICMP PTB 
with additional guarantees.



Yours,
Daniel



On Fri, Jul 28, 2023 at 1:33 AM Ben Schwartz 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

I don't understand what it would mean for an ESP packet to be "too big to be 
decrypted".  Do you mean that the decrypted payload is too big to deliver on 
the next link?



--Ben Schwartz

________________________________

From: IPsec <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> on behalf 
of Daniel Migault <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2023 9:32 PM
To: IPsecME WG <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Subject: [IPsec] -ikev2-mtu-dect: IKEv2 PTB Notification



In yesterday's presentation of the -ikev2-mtu-dect draft, I was asked why do we 
have such a notification instead of using a standard ICMP PTB message 
encapsulated in ESP.   I believe the confusion comes from me saying that the 
PTB message

In yesterday's presentation of the -ikev2-mtu-dect draft, I was asked why do we 
have such a notification instead of using a standard ICMP PTB message 
encapsulated in ESP.



I believe the confusion comes from me saying that the PTB message is sent AFTER 
the packet has been decrypted. This is not the case as the PTB is sent BECAUSE 
the encrypted packet is too big and so cannot be decrypted. In other words the 
packet that is too big is the ESP packet.



If the packet is too big and cannot be decrypted a Packet Too Big Notification 
(PTB) that specifies the Link MTU (LMTU) of the router component of the egress 
node (on network N) as well as the effective MTU to receive (EMTU_R). Both are 
configuration parameters.  An ICMP PTB message may also be sent by the egress 
node. Note that this ICMP may not contain even the SPI, and so is likely to not 
carry sufficient information to the ingress node, so any action be taken. 
Typically the ICMP message only carries the first 8 bytes start from IP header 
of the original packets. This is not sufficient when encapsulated as the 8 
bytes will not contain the SPI and the egress gateway will not be able to 
identify the concerned SA and so the concerned flow.



Yours,
Daniel




--

Daniel Migault

Ericsson




--

Daniel Migault

Ericsson


--
Daniel Migault
Ericsson


--
Daniel Migault
Ericsson


--
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
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