Thanks Songbo, both fixed in -06. From: Songbo Bu <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, June 1, 2026 9:19 PM To: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Subject: [EXTERNAL] [IPsec] Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-05.txt> (Post-quantum Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)) to Proposed Standard
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe. Hi, I reviewed draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-05 from an implementer and operational-readability perspective. I support publication as Proposed Standard. The draft is clear about how ML-KEM public keys and ciphertexts are carried in IKEv2 Key Exchange payloads, the need to follow the FIPS 203 recipient tests, and the PMTU/reliable-transport considerations for ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 in IKE_SA_INIT. Two very small editorial nits, if a -06 is already being prepared: * Section 1.1, Encaps bullet: s/intiator/initiator/ * Section 2, opening paragraph: s/where the the initiator’s/where the initiator’s/ Neither affects publication readiness. Best, Songbo Bu On Mon, 01 Jun 2026 10:14:14 -0700, The IESG [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> wrote: The IESG has received a request from the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG (ipsecme) to consider the following document: - ‘Post-quantum Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)’ as Proposed Standard The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> mailing lists by 2026-06-15. Exceptionally, comments may be sent to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. Abstract NIST standardized ML-KEM, a new key encapsulation mechanism, which can be used for quantum-resistant key establishment. This draft specifies how to use ML-KEM by itself or as an additional key exchange in IKEv2 along with a traditional key exchange. These options allow for negotiating IKE and Child SA keys which are safe against cryptographically relevant quantum computers. The file can be obtained via https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem/ The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/7227/ IPsec mailing list – [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
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