Document: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth Title: Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) using PQC Reviewer: Russ Housley Review result: Has Nits
I reviewed this document as part of the Security Directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors. Document authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other IETF Last Call comments. Document: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-09 Reviewer: Russ Housley Review Date: 2026-07-18 IETF LC End Date: 2026-07-31 IESG Telechat date: unknown Summary: Has Nits Major Concerns: None Minor Concerns: Section 6 says: The different parameter sets of SLH-DSA are identified via AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 objects, as specified in NIST [CSOR] and referenced in PKIX Algorithm Identifiers for the SLH-DSA [RFC9909]. [FIPS205] defines two signature modes: pure mode and pre-hash mode. PKIX Algorithm Identifiers for the SLH-DSA [RFC9909] specifies the use of both Pure SLH-DSA and HashSLH-DSA in Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). I think that discussing the fact that OIDs have been assigned for HashSLH-DSA leads to confusion since Section 3.2 says: This document specifies the use of pure mode for signature-based authentication in IKEv2, where the message is signed directly along with domain separation information. The data used for authentication in IKEv2, as described in Section 2.15 of IKEv2 [RFC7296], ... Please remove discussion of the HashSLH-DSA OIDs. Nits: Section 3.2: s/ML-DSA and SLH-DSA algorithms/ML-DSA and SLH-DSA algorithms, respectively/ Section 3.2: s/that implements side-/that implement side-/ Note: I checked the hex strings for the OIDs in Appendix B, and they are correct. _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
