Excellent analysis. I fully concur. Keith
> - using site local is roughly equivalent to using net 10 in IPv4. The > address range can be filtered in routers, but it is ambiguous. Ambiguity > prevents tracing the source of the leaks. > > - hijack a prefix is roughly equivalent to the pre-RFC-1958 situation in > IPv4, e.g. alumni reusing the MIT address space. The address range can > be filtered in some routers, but not in all of them. Leaks are difficult > to even notice, and result in misdirection of traffic to an unsuspecting > party. Leaks in the routing protocols result in routing disruption. > > - the addresses proposed in draft-hinden appear to be strictly better > than either the existing site-local or hijacked addresses. They can be > filtered in routers. Attempts at uniqueness give us a reasonable hope of > tracing the source of leaks. They don't conflict with existing > addresses, so the leaks don't affect the connectivity or the traffic > load of third parties. -------------------------------------------------------------------- IETF IPv6 working group mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] Administrative Requests: https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6 --------------------------------------------------------------------
