On 2007-05-17 03:29, Joe Abley wrote:
On 16-May-2007, at 18:54, Dow Street wrote:
It may not be the mechanism itself that is the inherent problem, but
rather the operational use model. In this case, disabling by default
and filtering when RH0 is turned on allows for careful investigation
and experimentation of different use models. Killing the mechanism
outright does not.
There is an argument that the right approach to facilitate source
routing experiments is to deprecate RH0, and define a new type of
routing header which is, from the outset, disabled by default.
Either that, or secured against spoofing by default. I wouldn't exclude
some sort of secured routing header being proposed for the ongoing
Routing and Addressing discussion over on the RAM list, but it surely
won't be anything as easy to abuse as RH0.
I support the draft.
Brian
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