Mark,

On Jan 27, 2010, at 00:44 MST, Mark Smith wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> 
> There have been a few discussions on a few operational mailing lists in
> the last few weeks about the use of longer than /64s on point-to-point
> links.
> 
> One valid reason to do so is to mitigate a Neighbor Discovery DoS,
> initiated by off-link sources sending traffic to incrementing
> destinations, causing the on-link router to issue large numbers of
> Neighbor Solicitations towards Solicited-Node multicast destinations
> for nodes that don't exist. 
> 
> RFC3756 described this vulnerability in section 4.3.2, "Neighbor
> Discovery DoS Attack".
> 
> This issue isn't specific to point-to-point links. Any /64 is
> vulnerable. People who're advocating longer than /64s for
> point-to-point links as a mitigation for this issue can also advocate
> using prefix lengths longer than /64 for all IPv6 subnets.
> 
> As I'm an advocate for the simplicity of using /64s for all links, I've
> been thinking how this issue could be avoided, without having to resort
> to longer than /64s, or other manual methods such as traffic filtering
> ACLs or static neighbor discovery entries.
> 
> At the end of the description of the issue, RFC3756 mentions
> 
> "This attack does not directly involve the trust models presented.
> However, if access to the link is restricted to registered nodes, and
> the access router keeps track of nodes that have registered for access
> on the link, the attack may be trivially plugged.  However, no such
> mechanisms are currently standardized."
> 
> I think Multicast Listener Discovery announcements for hosts'
> memberships of the Solicited Node multicast addresses could be used as
> this "membership registration" mechanism. When a router is asked
> to issue a neighbor solicitation for a downstream host, after it
> converts the destination address into a Solicited Node multicast
> address, is could then validate that multicast address against a list
> of known Solicited Node multicast addresses it has learned from the
> hosts via their MLD announcements. Neighbor Solications for Solicited
> Node multicast addresses that aren't known would be dropped, preventing
> off-link nodes from exhausting the router's neighbor discovery
> resources. 
> 
> Do people think using MLD announcements in this way would be suitable
> way to mitigate this DoS while preserving the simplicity of
> universal /64s?

Why not have routers just look at the IPv6 "Hop Limit" (TTL) field, and discard 
if hop limit < 255?  (Of course, you'd still want to apply an "infrastructure" 
ACL with GTSM so NMS systems still have visibility to your p2p interfaces, but 
that shouldn't be terribly difficult).

Have a look at RFC 5082: <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5082> for GTSM.

-shane




> 
> Regards,
> Mark.
> 
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> IETF IPv6 working group mailing list
> [email protected]
> Administrative Requests: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6
> --------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------
IETF IPv6 working group mailing list
[email protected]
Administrative Requests: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Reply via email to