Folks,

We have posted a revision of the aforementioned I-D, which (hopefully)
follows the suggestions made by Dave Thaler and Francis Dupont during
the 6man wg meeting in Orlando.

The rev is available at:
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gont-6man-ipv6-smurf-amplifier-03.txt>

Comments will be appreciated (particularly those of Dave and Francis ;-) )

Thanks!

Best regards,
Fernando




-------- Original Message --------
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-gont-6man-ipv6-smurf-amplifier-03.txt
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 18:26:16 -0700


A new version of I-D, draft-gont-6man-ipv6-smurf-amplifier-03.txt
has been successfully submitted by Fernando Gont and posted to the
IETF repository.

Filename:        draft-gont-6man-ipv6-smurf-amplifier
Revision:        03
Title:           Security Implications of IPv6 Options of Type 10xxxxxx
Creation date:   2013-03-21
Group:           Individual Submission
Number of pages: 12
URL:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gont-6man-ipv6-smurf-amplifier-03.txt
Status:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gont-6man-ipv6-smurf-amplifier
Htmlized:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-gont-6man-ipv6-smurf-amplifier-03
Diff:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-gont-6man-ipv6-smurf-amplifier-03

Abstract:
   When an IPv6 node processing an IPv6 packet does not support an IPv6
   option whose two-highest-order bits of the Option Type are '10', it
   is required to respond with an ICMPv6 Parameter Problem error
   message, even if the Destination Address of the packet was a
   multicast address.  This feature provides an amplification vector,
   opening the door to an IPv6 version of the 'Smurf' Denial-of-Service
   (DoS) attack found in IPv4 networks.  This document discusses the
   security implications of the aforementioned options, and formally
   updates RFC 2460 and RFC 4443 such that this attack vector is
   eliminated.  Additionally, it describes a number of operational
   mitigations that could be deployed against this attack vector.





The IETF Secretariat




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