Giving Osama more than his due Being obsessed with the al-Qaeda name can seriously hinder important counter-terrorism work.
BEHIND THE HEADLINES: BY BUNN NAGARA Star 22 April 2007 EARLY this month, the Malaysian Guantanamo inmate Mohd Nazir Lep admitted taking an oath before Osama bin Laden to attack US targets, and acting as a money courier for Indonesian-born terror suspect Hambali. But he denied taking any hostile action, or supporting or fraternising with al-Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiah (JI). In mid-April, Hambali (Riduan Isamudin) told a US military hearing that he was never associated with al-Qaeda. Fellow Guantanamo detainee Ali al-Azia, who said his uncle was terror suspect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, also denied any association with al-Qaeda. Last Wednesday, "top terror suspect" Abu Zubaydah told a US military tribunal that he had no association with Osama, after previously telling interrogators that he had. He also said he had been tortured by US forces to extract a confession. The perils of confessions obtained under duress include their retraction, lack of credibility and thus deniability at subsequent hearings. But such intrusion into vital counter-terrorism work is not new, particularly after Sept 11, 2001. The Philippine Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is often described as "Islamist" or "al-Qaeda-linked", which is untrue and therefore messy and misleading. It is a kidnap-for-ransom gang with no political agenda or religious scruples, and more properly described as a bandit group. When I highlighted how some vested Philippine interests used the term "al-Qaeda-linked" loosely, a senior British diplomat reminded me that Manila might not be happy to hear that. The fact is that President Gloria Arroyo herself concurs with this, and only a few Philippine generals mindful of how generous US policymakers can be to those fighting anything "al-Qaeda-linked" like to use the label. Few in Washington may even realise that the ASG was formed in the 1990s at the behest of some Philippine officials, with a co-founder being the Christian police agent Edwin Angeles who was known for taking on various official undercover missions. In time the ASG gave Muslim radicals such a bad name that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front even pledged to help government forces catch them. Former ASG spokesman Abu Sabaya was a flamboyant figure "confirmed killed" in a 2002 shootout even though his body was never found. Witnesses said he had stood prominently at the prow of a boat, suddenly clutched his chest dramatically as shooting began, fell into the water and only his belongings were found - although it was a slow-moving boat in shallow water. In time, the ASG might have come to act as a "lost patrol", recruited genuine criminals or radicals and forced to survive on criminal takings. Still, that would not stop some government agents from sharing in the loot of their kidnap ransom, nor would it necessarily link them with al-Qaeda. In Indonesia, there is still no evidence to link JI with al-Qaeda, or even to show that JI exists. Yet the standard mantra is of certain individuals being leading members of the al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiah. The recent release of Abubakar Ba'asyir, JI's alleged spiritual leader, has been blamed on the Indonesian legal system. But if it is anyone's fault, it must be that of the police and intelligence agencies in failing to provide the necessary evidence for the prosecution to act more resolutely. In the context of Indonesia's newfound democracy, the courts have done a good job in acting on the evidence presented and sound arguments made, not hunches or political pressure. Where they have failed is in releasing various convicted criminals early on occasions like public holidays, which could be a result of private inducements or political pressure. In Thailand, a few generals have begun the habit of describing some local insurgents as "al-Qaeda-linked", although nobody seems to be able to explain what this actually means. Thai commentators have ridiculed these fanciful and unfounded linkages. One of the hallmarks of al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks is their large-scale, spectacular nature designed to attract global attention. If anything, the small, piecemeal explosions in southern Thailand are just the opposite. On Friday, Thai authorities said insurgents had begun to use landmine detonators instead of cellphone-activated devices for their bombs. In going low tech, they appear to be moving further away from al-Qaeda's tactics. The problems with the al-Qaeda label include internationalising the problem, placing the solution further away, assuming a centralised global "control room" when there is none, and a preoccupation with a remote Osama instead of the terror threat in hand. The only advantage is the prospect of receiving more US funds, for whatever ultimate purpose.
