War With Iran
Who Would Benefit From It?
By Arash Jalali
Freelance Journalist - Tehran
Forward By : http://www.shariqkhan.page.tl
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addresses
a news conference in Tehran, April 4, 2007 (Reuters Photo).
The "International Community" is increasingly tightening the ropes of sanctions
on Iran with the hope of budging Iran's stance on the nuclear issue. Yet, the
Islamic Republic's tone seems to be moving more boldly towards embracing the
possibility of total isolation, or even military confrontation, rather than
attempting to diffuse the tensions and managing the issue within the realm of
diplomacy. In fact, not only is Iran not showing any willingness to take any
positive steps, with the ceasing of the 15 British sailors and the subsequent
war of words, but also it seems that the Iranian leadership is looking forward
to further fueling an already volatile situation. The reactions of the Western
countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, with respect to
all these issues, have not been any more promising.
While Americans say they should be given credit for seeking cooperation from
and sitting at the same table with the Iranians on the issue of security in
Iraq, they all the same capture Iranian citizens allegedly members of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who Iran claims to be diplomats in
Iraq. This is in addition to the retired Iranian defense ministry official who
is claimed by the Iranian government to have been kidnapped by US and Israeli
intelligence operatives in Turkey, a claim both the United States and Israel
deny (BBC).
The question that hovers in the minds of many Iranians is on whether some
sort of non-diplomatic (i.e. military) confrontation between the United States
and Iran would eventually occur. How unreasonable or far-fetched a
confrontation scenario might seem to the average person has little bearing on
whether or not it will actually happen.
What does matter is how committed the two sides are to a cause, be it
diplomacy or military confrontation. This was certainly the case when everyone
wondered if the United States would really invade Iraq, and the same logic
applies to the current situation with Iran, except that this time, it is not
just the dominant Neoconservative doctrine within the US administration that
would like to see the standoff end with a military confrontation. Parts of the
Iranian establishment, as also witnessed by some political analysts, seem to
have some interest in escalating the situation to something more than just a
diplomatic row (Ansari).
During the 1980s, there was no room for any form of freedom. The
state interfered with every aspect of people's private lives. The 1980s
Nostalgia
Certain elements within the Iranian regime, specifically the hardliner
president as well as part of the IRGC that supports him, have strong reasons to
not only invite but also to actively pursue a path that leads to some sort of
political cul-de-sac, which could in turn call for a preferably limited
military solution as opposed to an all-out invasion. These reasons are both
political as well as economic.
Since the very first day of his election, President Ahmadinejad has not hidden
his deep admiration for the 1980s as a golden era. Politically, the 1980s was
marked by what Ayatollah Khomeini called the "unity of words." There was no
open talk of Left or Right in the political spectrum. There was only one party
and that was Hezbollah (the Party of God)[i]. You were either with the party of
God or with the "infidels." Socially, there was virtually no room for any
form of freedom. The state interfered with every aspect of people's private
lives. Scenes of the regime's agents raiding houses and arresting people for no
crime other than cheering and dancing at a wedding party were quite ordinary.
At roadblocks and checkpoints, the armed men searched almost every car that
passed by, not really hoping to find anything obviously illegal, such as
weapons or drugs, but simple things such as music cassettes.
The situation with the press was much worse than it is now. Not even mild
criticisms were tolerated. In fact, the regime saw to it that nobody with that
mindset would even be allowed to work for the press.
The country's economy was completely controlled by the state. Everything was
either owned or totally controlled and regulated by the government. Economy was
really the art of giving out rations of life's necessities. Anything more than
that was considered luxury at the time, which by definition was a symbol of the
corrupt lifestyle of the royalty that existed before the revolution.
All this could easily be justified by the fact that the country was engaged
in a devastating and costly war, not just with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, but
effectively with the whole World, including and especially the West, headed by
the United States. The war provided a platform for the regime's political,
social, as well as economical monopoly.
Economic Troubles Ahead
Ahmadinejad got almost all the votes that he did not get through
vote-rigging, by making promises for bringing economic prosperity; promises to
"bring the oil to people's dining tables," as he put it in his campaign
speeches. Soon after he took office, he denied having ever said that. The
government spokesman jokingly said that the government would not bring oil to
people's dining tables, "because it has a bad smell." Ahmadinejad also promised
to fight what he called "the oil mafia."
When Ali Saeedloo, Vice-President for Executive Affairs, who at one time was
nominated for the post of ministry of oil, was asked who this oil mafia really
is, he answered, "I do not know. Why don't you ask the president himself?"
"The government's trial period is over," Hashemi Rafsanjani. During the
first year of his presidency, Ahmadinejad tried to dismiss all the criticisms
of his economic failures by either attributing the problems to "hidden hands
behind the scenes" hands whose identity he never revealed or by simply
saying that it is too early to make any judgments about the administration's
failure or success. The time has now passed: His presidency is almost half-way
through, and as his rival Hashemi Rafsanjani noted in one of his recent
interviews, "the government's trial period is over" (Trait). Economic
troubles, in the meantime, have nothing but worsened, and there is no
indication of this changing for the better in the coming year. Ahmadinejad's
budget plan for the new Iranian year is a clear indication of his troubles
ahead.
Huge spending on operational expenses (i.e. paying salaries to government
employees, handing out short-term loans, etc.) assuming that his government
can somehow manage to find the money is predicted by experts to cause
double-digit inflation rates. This is aside from the effect of sudden reduction
of the gasoline subsidies a move that neither the government nor the
parliament are still quite sure about.
Also, according to the research center of the currently right-wing controlled
parliament, the projected earnings of the government will only be realized if
the average oil price per barrel would stay close to US$52 more than 20
dollars above the price on which the budget has been seemingly laid out
(Iranian Parliament Research Center).
The government traditionally acquired funds for development projects by
issuing bonds. This is known to have a long-term effect on the budget plans of
the years to follow. This year, Ahmadinejad will also have to pay the dues for
redeeming the bonds issued during Khatami's presidency. It is therefore
essential for them to keep the oil prices up. Creating tension would be one way
to do it.
Ahmadinejad's economical problems will not simply stop at the budget,
however. With the 1980s model of governance, he has shown a strong tendency
against privatization, even though the country's five-year development plans,
and the two-decade growth outlook both demand that the government moves towards
privatization and downsizing.
If Ahmadinejad moves on with his trend of enlarging the government again, he
will lose some of the income past governments have assembled through selling
government-owned companies and businesses to the private sector. This will make
his government even more reliant on the oil income.
Additionally, a limited conflict, or even some pseudo-conflict that can be
sold to the public as a viable and real threat, will give Ahmadinejad the
perfect scapegoat, blaming the US and the West at large for his failing
economic policies; not to mention the fact that in the event that such a
conflict does occur, all criticism of government policies would not even be
allowed to be voiced.
US Presidential Elections
In 2004, President George W. Bush was reelected despite the fact that by that
time it had become clear that his main reason for invading Iraq, i.e. weapons
of mass destruction, was based on false intelligence and therefore unjustified.
If one is to disregard claims that in order to win the reelection the GOP too
committed serious campaign violations in many states, including in the deciding
state of Ohio, the only alternative explanation offered by some analysts for
Bush's victory is that public's overall perception at the time was that the
best person to "clean up the mess," so to speak, would be the person who made
it in the first place; that the Iraqi situation needed to be sorted out, not
hastily abandoned, as was likely to be done by the Democrats.
In the November 2006 congressional elections, the message was quite
clear: People's patience is "wearing thin."In the November 2006 congressional
elections however, the message was quite clear: People's patience is "wearing
thin," as Zalmai Khalilzad put it, and they could not trust the Republicans
with Iraq anymore. It might sound like a far-fetched idea, but the only thing
that could put a "Neo-con" policy back on the map for the 2008 presidential
election is most probably another crisis such as a war. With lessons learned
from Iraq, this time the Americans might be looking for a limited conflict, one
that has a very low chance of failure, requires no long-term troops
commitments, yet is significant enough to make them look like the saviors of
the world against "the most dangerous nation in the world." Iran is the only
country that fits the profile; thanks in no small part to Ahmadinejad's
adventurism.
Regional Factors
With the understandable exception of Kuwait, and partly Saudi Arabia, many
Arab states were not very happy about the prospect of a US invasion of Iraq in
2003. Countries like the UAE lost a lot of tourism revenue during the weeks and
months following America's attack on Iraq. Other governments simply feared the
public reaction to any cooperation with the Americans in an invasion of another
Arab country.
Not only is this not the case with Iran, many countries including Saudi
Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Jordan would very much like Iran to be "contained," to
say the least. Saudi Arabia and Jordan have not concealed their concerns with
the formation of the Iranian-supported "Shiite Crescent", in Iraq and in
Lebanon (Wright and Baker). The UAE is already a huge absorbent of Iranian
capital. More than 400,000 Iranians are estimated to have already invested up
to US$200 billion in Dubai, mostly in the real estate business (Iran Daily).
In event of any conflict, this figure will undoubtedly increase. Qatar, which
shares vast oil and gas reserves with Iran, would very much enjoy seeing Iran
engaged with some pressing issue that keeps it from further developing its oil
and gas exploration and production plans just like it did during the
eight-year Iran-Iraq war.
Although these countries might not want to be actively involved in any
military conflict between Iran and the United States, their sheer political
support and blessing would make America's job much easier.
All this should be added to Israel's desire for an "allied" attack on Iran,
albeit a limited one against its military and nuclear infrastructure.
The fate of Iran and the entire Middle East region is at crossroads. Forces
both within and without would like to see Iran engage in some sort of military
confrontation with the West, especially the United States. It is up to
pragmatic and moderate minds on both sides to recognize this desire for
conflict and try to balance and contain the reckless.
It is also crucial that the people Iranians as well as Americans be
careful not to fall into populist traps of their hardliner governments. When
Ahmadinejad uses Iran's "ancient history" one which they always tried to play
down against Iran's "Islamic identity" to appeal to people's nationalist
sentiment, we Iranians should not be fooled. When Dick Cheney still insists on
links existing between pre-2003 Iraq and Al-Qaeda, the American people should
understand what he is really after: to still present war as a justifiable
solution to any perceived problem.
Sources:
Ansari, Ali. "Comment: 'Not a Time for Hyperbole or Mislaid Threats'." Times
Online. 30 March 2007. Accessed 22 April 2007. "Capital Flight to Dubai
Worrisome." Iran Daily, 8 March 2006. Accessed 22 April 2007.
"Interview With US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns." BBC. 29 March
2007. Accessed 22 April 2007.
"Full Implementation of the Budget Would Be Impossible With an Oil Price Less
Than US$52 per Barrel." Iranian Parliament Research Center. Accessed 22 April
2007.
Trait, Robet. "Ahmadinejad Challenged for Control of Iran's Economy."
Guardian Unlimited. 7 March, 2007. Accessed 22 April 2007.
Wright, Robin and Peter Baker. "Iraq, Jordan See Threat To Election From
Iran." Washington Post. 8 December 2004. Accessed 22 April 2007.
---------------------------------
Arash Jalaliis an Iranian computer engineer who lives in Iran. He
occasionally writes articles for several blogs.
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