"This again brings the question of who would benefit from Karkare's death and 
the timing of the Mumbai attack―it is important to emphasize that all 
contractual terrorist operations are, and I am quoting a CIA manual here (the 
CIA and the Mossad excel in contract terrorism as can be seen from several 
books, especially on CIA-Mossad operations in Beirut and Lebanon) "in essence a 
question of gamble. We do it to achieve multiple objectives. But it is almost 
impossible that all those objectives will be met; even if one or two are met, 
the operation is a success". 

The Mumbai attack has the appearance of a `multiple objective' strike, in which 
some objectives like Karkare's death were met and some, like BJP's winning 
elections in Delhi and Rajasthan were not." 





Did Mumbai terrorists work through Bona-fide Indian Police Informers?

Amaresh Misra  

http://www.unnindia.com/english/story.php?Id=3641
A new revelation, which actually repeats a pattern seen before, casts its own 
shadow over the Mumbai terror attack.
A report, appearing on several Indian and International news agencies claims 
that, persons who probably brought SIM cards used by Mumbai terrorists could 
have been Police informers and people working for different Indian State Police 
or intelligence forces: 

"One of the two Indian men arrested for illegally buying mobile phone cards 
used by the gunmen in the Mumbai attacks was a counterinsurgency police officer 
who may have been on an undercover mission, security officials said Saturday, 
demanding his release. The arrests, announced in the eastern city of Calcutta, 
were the first since the bloody siege ended. But what was touted as a rare 
success for India's beleaguered law enforcement agencies, quickly turned sour 
as police in two Indian regions squared off against one another. 

Senior police officers in Indian Kashmir, which has been at the heart of 
tensions between India and Pakistan, demanded the release of the officer, 
Mukhtar Ahmed, saying he was one of their own and had been involved in 
infiltrating Kashmiri militant groups. Indian authorities believe the banned 
Pakistani-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has links to Kashmir, 
trained the gunmen and plotted the attacks that left 171 people dead after a 
three-day rampage through Mumbai that began Nov. 26. 

The implications of Ahmed's involvement - that Indian agents may have been in 
touch with the militants and perhaps supplied the SIM cards used in the attacks 
added to the growing list of questions over India's ill-trained security 
forces, which are widely blamed for not thwarting the attacks. 

Earlier Saturday, Calcutta police announced the arrests of Ahmed and Tauseef 
Rahman, who allegedly bought SIM cards by using fake documents, including 
identification cards of dead people. The cards allow users switch their 
cellular service to phones other than their own. 

Rahman, of West Bengal state, later sold them to Ahmed, said Rajeev Kumar a 
senior Calcutta police officer. 

Both men were arrested Friday and charged with fraud and criminal conspiracy, 
Kumar said, adding that police were still investigating how the 10 gunmen 
obtained the SIM cards. 

But the announcement had police in Srinagar, the main city in Indian-controlled 
Kashmir, fuming. 

We have told Calcutta police that Ahmed is "our man and it's now up to them how 
to facilitate his release," said one senior officer speaking on condition of 
anonymity due to the sensitivity of the information. Other police officials in 
Kashmir supported his account. 

The officer said Ahmed was a Special Police Officer, part of a semiofficial 
counterinsurgency network whose members are usually drawn from former 
militants. The force is run on a special funding from the federal Ministry of 
Home Affairs. 

"Sometimes we use our men engaged in counterinsurgency ops to provide SIM cards 
to the (militant) outfits so that we track their plans down," said the officer. 

Police said Ahmed was recruited to the force after his brother was killed five 
years ago, allegedly by Lashkar-e-Taiba militants for being a police informer. 

About a dozen Islamic militant groups have been fighting in Kashmir since 1989, 
seeking independence from mainly Hindu India or a union with Muslim-majority 
Pakistan. 

India and Pakistan have fought two of their three wars over the Himalayan 
region, which is divided between them and claimed by both in its entirety. 

The Calcutta police denied the claims from Srinagar. "This is not true," said 
Kumar. 

The bungling and miscommunications among India's many security services comes 
as police said they were re-examining another suspected Lashkar militant who 
was arrested nine months before the attacks carrying hand-drawn sketches of 
Mumbai hotels, the train terminal and other targeted sites". 

It is a standard and understandable practice of Indian security forces to use 
captured militants or ex-militants with grievances for counter-insurgency 
operations. What is strange is that SIM cards purchased by these agents working 
for Government agencies were used by Mumbai terrorists. We can see here a 
direct clash between the Kashmir and the Calcutta Police. 

This could have been dismissed as a one off instance were it not for the fact 
that even earlier there have been reports of Police informers and even 
Pakistanis working as double agents for RAW being framed in terror attacks in 
India. 

One such affair is the strange case of the Red Fort terror attack, resembling 
the Parliamentary attack, in December 2007. A man named Muhammad Arif alias 
Ashfaq was caught and sentenced to be hanged for being the mastermind. The 
Court let all other `terrorists' go. 

Tehelka has this to say in a report: 

"Arif candidly acknowledged that he was a Pakistani in his statement under 
Section 313 of the CrPC. But he also explained in detail the circumstances 
under which he came to India. Arif claimed that he was an operative for RAW, 
India's external intelligence agency. His statement reads: "I used to work for 
the 'X' branch of RAW since 1997. On the last day of June 2000, I went to 
Kathmandu to give some documents to Sanjeev Gupta. I reached there from 
Pakistan by a PIA (Pakistan International Airlines) flight on my passport 
number 634417... Sanjeev Gupta accompanied me to Raxaul and from there I came 
to India by train. He gave me the address of one 
Nain Singh and his telephone number (6834454), saying he would accommodate me. 
Nain Singh gave me a room in his own house. He advised me not to tell my real 
name and address to anyone, and to say that I was a resident of Jammu." 

The evidence gathered by TEHELKA indicates that Arif wasn't lying. He did stay 
with Nain Singh, who was working for RAW and who admitted before the court that 
he was employed with the Cabinet Secretariat, the usual euphemism for RAW. Arif 
stayed for oneand- a-half months in Nain Singh's house in south-east Delhi's 
Okhla village. While Nain Singh acknowledged Arif's stay in his house, he 
explained it away by saying that the house belonged to his mother. "Azam Mailk 
was a tenant in the house. He brought Arif to my mother. I was not in Delhi at 
the time. Arif informed me that he was a resident of Jammu. I told my mother 
that the house should not be rented to a Kashmiri. Thereafter he vacated the 
house within one-and-a-half months." When the court asked Nain Singh about what 
he did, Singh replied: "I cannot disclose my present official address. I cannot 
produce my identity card in the open court (the identity card was shown to the 
judge and returned). I am
 working for the Cabinet Secretariat. I cannot disclose whether I am working 
for RAW." 

But this aspect and Nain Singh's credentials were not probed: 

"Nain Singh was not cross-questioned. The police did not deem it fit to 
investigate what a Pakistani national charged with a terror attack was doing 
staying in the house of a RAW operative. Instead, the Special Cell made Singh a 
government witness. The Delhi High Court took strong exception to this. Says 
the High Court judgement, "Nain Singh, who appears to have been working for 
some intelligence wing of the government, definitely cannot be made a 
prosecution witness. It cannot be expected that he wouldn't have known that the 
person to whom he let out his house was a foreigner who had gained illegal 
entry to India." Why are Arif's links with Nain Singh not being enquired into? 
Are those working for intelligence agencies above the law? The High Court 
raised objections but went ahead and endorsed Arif's death sentence. Arif may 
well be guilty but can he be hanged when so many questions remain unanswered? 

There are more loopholes. Phone records indicate that Arif and Nain Singh did 
not sever their relations after the Pakistani moved out of the RAWofficers' 
home. Not just this, Arif was in touch with two officials in the Special Cell 
― Inspector RS Bhasin and Ved Prakash ― because they had been introduced to 
him by Nain Singh. The Delhi High Court in its judgment, however, says: "It 
appears to us that the accused must have taken some advantage of his 
acquaintance with the police and intelligence officials, and under the shelter 
of that acquaintance must have been carrying out nefarious activities." 

The court recognises the fact that Arif was getting some leverage from the 
Special Cell but stops short of critically examining the phone records 
according to which Arif and the Special Cell officers were in regular touch 
with each other. Another question rises over how a man acquainted with members 
of the Special Cell could have plotted and carried out the attack without their 
having any idea of it? At any rate, the fact that Arif was in touch with the 
officers even before the attack casts serious doubts on the objectivity of the 
investigation". 

In the light of such evidence, it is pertinent to look at what Arif has to say. 
He denies any role in the Red Fort terror attack. Instead, he alleges that the 
Special Cell operatives, whom he was in touch with, have falsely implicated him 
in the case. In his statement, Arif mentions an amount of Rs 7 lakh sent to 
Nain Singh through Sanjeev Gupta for Arif's use. "But Nain Singh did not admit 
to receiving the money... I spoke to Sanjeev Gupta and opened an account with 
HDFC Bank. My chequebook remained with Nain Singh. Whenever I needed money, I 
used to take it from Nain Singh. My asking for money used to annoy Nain Singh, 
and he ultimately got me falsely involved in this case." 

A bank account was indeed opened in Arif's name at HDFC with the help of fake 
documents. Arif had a fake ration card and a fake driving licence. His bank 
account number, 0891000024344, had Rs 5,53,000 at the time of his arrest. 
According to the police, the money had come through hawala transactions. A 
person who had access to his account would have gained if Arif was not in the 
picture. 

Arif told the court he had become adamant in demanding his money from Nain 
Singh. He alleged that on December 25, 2000, Nain Singh called him to his 
residence, where he met Bhasin and Prakash. The two took Arif to the Lodhi 
Colony police station and, along with a Sikh officer, interrogated him. "They 
asked about my entire background," Arif told the court. Thereafter, he was 
dropped off at Singh's house from where he went to his home in Ghazipur in East 
Delhi. He was arrested there later that night. 

The key evidence that links Arif to the site of the crime are the call records 
of his two mobile phone numbers (9811278510 and 9811242154), which the police 
claim were used from a single handset (IMEI number 445199440940240). However, 
TEHELKA's investigation shows that the records were tampered with (see box). 
The tampering was done in such a manner as to show that both numbers were used 
from one phone in Arif's possession. 

There are several inconsistencies in the police version. The time of Arif's 
arrest is not the same in the FIR and the arrest memo; the pistol number 
recovered from Arif recorded in the seizure memo is different from the one 
mentioned in the expert examination report ― the High Court called it "an 
inadvertent error by the writer". There were no public witnesses when the 
evidence was collected, either at Red Fort or at Arif's house. While Head 
Constable Satbir Singh claims that an AK-47 was found near Vijay Ghat, his 
colleagues claim it was an AK-56. 

There is confusion over the route the terrorists are said to have taken to 
enter Red Fort. While Captain SP Patwardhan says they would have entered from 
the Saleem Garh Gate/Yamuna Bridge, the cops says they came from the Lahori 
Gate. The two gates are at opposite ends of the Red Fort complex. The rope the 
terrorists allegedly used to let themselves down from the walls of the Fort was 
found lying in a coil on the Fort's terrace. Nobody saw the terrorists' faces. 
The only description available is of two men dressed in black. The chowkidar on 
duty at the Lahori Gate was never questioned. A call was made from the number 
9811278510 to BBC journalists in New Delhi and Srinagar just after the Red Fort 
attack. The caller said the attack had been carried out by the LeT. Mool Chand 
Sharma, an inspector in the Special Cell, said in his statement: "I reached Red 
Fort along with my staff at about 10:45pm. 

The commissioner of police and senior army officers were already there. There I 
came to know that terrorists belonging to the LeT had shot dead three army 
personnel and escaped." How did Sharma know the attackers were from the LET 
even before the investigation had started? To send a man to the gallows on the 
basis of such flimsy evidence is nothing if not a mockery of justice. Is Arif 
an easy scapegoat, or is he just a pawn in some greater conspiracy? Hanging him 
will not provide the answers". 

So what do we make of all this? Has anyone mentioned the Red Fort case? There 
have been so many instances when several Police agents etc have been double 
crossed and killed. The pattern seems to be that either these forces are being 
used by Indian State actors who are aware of their existence or that our 
security forces have been infiltrated or both. 

The second shock comes from the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP); there an India 
Today report discloses that the Rampur Police has disclosed that much before 
the Mumbai attack, they had caught a terrorist in Rampur who had confessed 
about impending attacks not just in Mumbai but Taj and other destinations: 

"Mumbai Police had clear intelligence inputs on an imminent terrorist attack, 
according to the Special Task Force (STF) of Uttar Pradesh police. 
Contradicting Maharashtra Home Minister R.R. Patil's claim, the STF said 
Lashkar-e-Tayyeba terrorist Fahim Ahmed Ansari, presently lodged in Rampur 
jail, had revealed the plan to it and to Mumbai Police which had interrogated 
him in February-end. 

Fahim was nabbed by the STF on February 10 this year, along with two others, 
for his involvement in the Rampur CRPF camp attack on January 1, 2008 in which 
seven soldiers and a civilian were killed. UP police had proclaimed him 
mastermind for the planned Mumbai attack right after it recovered a map of 
Mumbai with important establishments earmarked and railway tickets from Lucknow 
to Mumbai from him. On Thursday, additional director general of police (STF) 
Brij Lal reiterated the claim: "Fahim was mastermind for the Mumbai attack. He 
was assigned to make arrangements for terrorists in Mumbai and had visited it 
several times in this regard. He had revealed all this to us and to Mumbai 
Police." 

Two terrorists had been nabbed along with Fahim on February 10 - Muhammad Anwar 
and Arshad Ali. The U.P. STF had arrested three others of the group from 
Charbagh Railway Station in Lucknow on the same night (February 10) and 
identified them as Sabauddin Ahmed, Abu Zar and Abu Sama. Sabauddin was also 
involved in attack on Bangalore's Indian Institute of Sciences (IISc) on 
December 28, 2005 in which a professor had died. 

The U.P. STF had said that they were fidayeens, trained to attack military 
camps, police establishments and important civilian centres and were on their 
way to Mumbai. Brij Lal said when the information was conveyed to Mumbai 
Police, it took Fahim on remand in the last week of February before he was sent 
back to Rampur jail in March. "He had revealed during interrogation in Mumbai 
that he and Anwar had visited all important centres in Mumbai, including the 
Bombay Stock Exchange and the Taj Mahal Hotel," he said. 

U.P. police also believe the Fahim link gets credence from the fact that the 
attacks in Mumbai bear a striking resemblance to the attack in Rampur as 
terrorists ran amok in the city and took people hostage. "Since the Mumbai and 
Rampur attacks have the same pattern, we believe the terrorists had shelved 
their Mumbai plan for some time only to execute it to deadly effect now with 
minor changes in the blueprint," said a top U.P. police officer. Sources in 
Uttar Pradesh home department say now Fahim and Anwar would be brought to 
Lucknow from Rampur jail in a day or two for fresh interrogation". 

Rakesh Maria of the Mumbai has confirmed that "Fahim might be the mastermind 
behind the Mumbai attack". 

So, if this is Rakesh Maria's attiude, then what about all the stories that 
Kasab the terrorist caught by the Police is telling? For the record, Kasab did 
not mention even once the name of Faheem. 

This might be because Kasab did not know about the existence of Faheem―if 
that is the case, then the Mumbai attack seems much more and more a 
contractual-mercenary operation, during which the direct executors, people like 
Kasab, do not know either the `mastermind' or the mastermind behind the 
mastermind, who would have given the supari or the contract for the operation. 

So, the question which no one is asking, that was this a contract operation? 
And who might have given out the contract? 

This again brings the question of who would benefit from Karkare's death and 
the timing of the Mumbai attack―it is important to emphasize that all 
contractual terrorist operations are, and I am quoting a CIA manual here (the 
CIA and the Mossad excel in contract terrorism as can be seen from several 
books, especially on CIA-Mossad operations in Beirut and Lebanon) "in essence a 
question of gamble. We do it to achieve multiple objectives. But it is almost 
impossible that all those objectives will be met; even if one or two are met, 
the operation is a success". 

The Mumbai attack has the appearance of a `multiple objective' strike, in which 
some objectives like Karkare's death were met and some, like BJP's winning 
elections in Delhi and Rajasthan were not. 

11th Dec 2008, 11:14 pm.

With Regards 

Abi


      

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