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Thanks for the idea of "benign triggers" (is that Cisco's exact
terminology?)

One of the zen issues is that IDSs don't detect intrusions, but instead
detect things that CORRELATE with intrusions. For the most part, there is no
such thing as a "false-positive" (unless there is a true bug), but there is
a huge grey area between how well things correlate with intrusions. I like
the term "benign triggers" much better than "false-positives", though we are
likely stuck with the imperfect terminology.

ISS is currently working on documenting the triggers for our signatures. We
are "protocol-analysis" based rather than "signature"-based, so is not
always a simple explanation as to why we trigger. Also, we are
closed-source, so we aren't going to reveal to the customer the source code
for them to figure it out.

For an example, the following two "signatures" discuss how the product
triggers, correctly or falsely:
http://www.networkice.com/advice/intrusions/2001735/
http://www.networkice.com/advice/intrusions/2000112/
Scroll down to the "Trigger" section.

Neither has a simple "pattern" that packets are scanned for, the situation
is much more complex. We aren't going to document the exact procedure, but
we are trying to give the customers some hints to work with. BTW: I picked
those two because the "Trigger" help isn't all that extensive. Since we are
going to have about 900 individual "signatures" to go back and document, the
individual help will likely be a little sparse and not very helpful unless
you understand the subject matter well. E.g. it is helpful to know that the
Loki signature is more than just a single packet trigger, and that the
Callit PING uses protocol-analysis rather than pattern-search. It'll get
better over time, though.

Note that there is a separate "noise" issue: yes, many events are real, but
are they worth bothering about? A lot of IDS vendors are talking noise
reduction these days. BlackICE correlates response codes with requests to
detect success, RealSecure differentiates between scans and exploits (e.g.
RealSecure detects more HTTP exploits than anybody, but triggers the least
upon a CGI-scan), and many vendors correlate victim vulnerability/OS with
attack. Some vendors are calling this "false-positive" reduction, but it
really is a wholly separate class of problem. (It is an important problem,
though).

Rob.
Lead Archtictect, ISS



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Greg Shipley [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2001 7:33 PM
> To: Klaus, Chris (ISSAtlanta)
> Cc: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'; '[EMAIL PROTECTED]'
> Subject: Re: Truth about False Positives
>
>
>
> On Thu, 6 Sep 2001, Klaus, Chris (ISSAtlanta) wrote:
>
> > If you know of any false positives, feel free to email me
> with what is
> > the false positives, what was triggering it, and any additional
> > information you can supply, and we'll work to improve the
> algorithm to
> > remove the false positive.
>
> Something that Cisco (and others?) are doing, which ISS may want to
> consider doing/expanding, is documenting "benign triggers" in
> the product
> itself.  Personally, I find these very useful.  For example,
> if I see a
> "IIS CodePurple Flying Saucer Attack" but there are notes
> saying that this
> is sometimes caused by the construction of a Krogarth over
> the network in
> the Total Annihilation video game, that saves me a lot of time.
>
> While it would be cool to completely eliminate all
> false-positives, based
> on my limited understanding of current signature-based
> technology, I don't
> forsee this happening (completely) in the near future.
> Helping educate
> the user with some useful data could help on this front...
>
> For whatever its worth,
>
> -Greg


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